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ABSTRACT
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MAY 1987

SHANE PHELAN, B.A., CALIFORNIA
STATE UNIVERSITY,

NORTHRIDGE (1978)
B.A.,

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,
NORTHRIDGE (1980)
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF
MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Jerome

B.

King

The dissertation seeks to
understand lesbi,.an-

feminism as a theory addressing the
needs of lesbians for
a positive identity and sense
of community.
it

locates

this development within the larger
context of the problems facing liberalism in the late
twentieth century,

in

particular the issues surrounding the social
construction
of the self.

The criticisms of modern society made by

lesbian-feminists are largely the same as those made
by
male and heterosexual female communitarian opponents
of
liberalism, though their understandings of their projects

often diverge.
Early chapters examine the problems of liberalism,
first in the recent literature of political theory, then

in the specific context
of the treatment of
lesbians.

Liberalism is seen to hide
or minimize loci of
social
conflict in a way that,
ironically, denies dignity
to
those it seeks to help.
chapter Three examines the
rise
of lesbian-feminism as a
response to this 'poverty
of
liberalism' and finds that
lesbian-feminism fails to provide a ground for genuine
autonomy and dignity, instead

offering the lesbian an insular
community that is defined
in terms strikingly similar
to those used by opponents
of
homosexual practices and identity.

Chapter Four treats

the issue of sadomasochism as a
result of the peculiar

configurations of power and sexuality
engendered by
lesbian-feminism, considering the argument
as both

a lo-

gical development of these configurations
and as evidence
of their problematic nature.
The final chapter concludes that the failure
of

lesbian-feminism to develop

a

theory that remedies the

problems of liberalism without engendering

a totalist,

narcissistic community is in fact due to the nature of
the modern self, a self that is peculiarly trained for

and suited to the liberal ideal of self-control and re-

sponsible choice.
of,

This self cannot be simply disposed

but must be accounted for in the further development

vi

of liberalise In

direction that does justice
to the
reality of community and
social life while
nonetheless
acknowledging the dignity of
a self that transcends
social construction.
a
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INTRODUCTION

Why would a poXitical
theorist write about
lesbianf e mi n ism?
Is there even £uch a
tMng
lesbian _ feminism
to be addressed? if
there*
a4
nere 1S „v
what
does it have to do
with political theory?

^

U

.

'

Political theories premise
themselves upon conceptions of human nature and
the self.
These conceptions
carry recommendations for
the construction of
society and
Polity.

The premises do not concern
simply the questions

we traditionally label
'political'

obligation, order, and justice.

-

questions involving

They also bear on the

issues at the heart of all
social relations

-

problems of

language, of sexuality, of
difference.
In the current era,

these issues have emerged at
the

forefront of political theory.

This emergence is at

least partially due to the breakdown
of the liberal

separation between society and politics
which is itself
so characteristically modern.

The challenges to

liberalism have relied heavily upon the
recognition of
the ways in which our political relations
are shaped by
our social and economic conditions and
expectations, and

this recognition has served in turn to structure
our

1

W

ideas of how a more
human, more
'"ore just, «
h
order
would look
LeSbian femlniS
3 th
™'
of the oppression
a nd
nature of lesMans and
women , ls one of
these vlsions
Seeing the limits of
liberalism
/

"

-y
,

s

^^

lesbian-feminists have sought
to explain those li
mits and
to offer an alternative
oonception of proper human
relations.
This conception is a
species of the fa m il
y 0f
theories that is loosely
labelled communitarian'
The
hallmark of co mm unitariani
sm is, first, the
recognition
that humans are not
ontologically isolated - that
they
are ' social animals'
zooi politikoi, by their
,
nature
bound together through language
and
.

culture; and second,

the appeal to a return to,
or erection of, a political
order that does justice to
this recognition by fostering
and enriching the ties between
us.

These theories are

neither 'conservative' or 'radical'
in nature, unless
they are both - united in their
rejection of the limited
liberal state.
For writers such as Alisdair
Maclntyre
and Michael Oakeshott, the communitarian
stance serves to
criticize the poverty of tradition and
order in

modernity.

For those such as Karl Marx, it provides
the

wedge with which to pry open the locked doors
of

capitalism and expose the tyranny behind neutrality.

A prime example of the
problematic status of
communitarianism is .ean-aacques
Rousseau.
Seemi ng i y
radrcal in his critiq
ue of the society
around him, an
inspiration for the Fre nch
Revolution, he

_

^

Edmund Burxe as the author
of wanton destruction.
However, this radical
loudly protested the
growing
license and equality of
women in society, earning
himself
the hatred of feminists
and the
title of reactionary.

there a contradiction?

Is

Perhaps to the liberal,
with her

particular understanding of
equality and freedom, but
not
to Rousseau.
Amidst the complexities
of his thought we

see a coherence.

This coherence rests on
the under-

standing that political life
does not exist in a vacuum,
that political community requires
social cohesion of a
sort that capitalism erodes.
His conception of the just

political order is inseparable from
his vision of the
moral family and its 'natural'
order.
Is this inseparability a fluke,

Rousseau?

a

flaw unique to

Or is it a consequence of the
nature of com-

munitarian thought itself,
any critic of liberalism?

a

danger to be addressed by

Communitarians on all points

of the political spectrum have had
to face charges that

they in fact ignore the rights and freedoms
of some in

.

order to ensure
those of others, or
that they reject
fundamental liberties
in the
i-ne quest for
fn
those overlooked
by Uberal the °
rists
«- mandate arises from
Co., tradition, or
the general wiU(
the
looms before the
communitarian is , what
do „ e do
those who d0 not fit
into God's order, who
defy
tradition, who reject or
obstruct the will of the
peoplg ,
in short, the problem
is: how do we deal
with difference?
Lesb ians in the twentieth
century are a group
defined by difference fro,
an aS su med nor m
The history
of their attempts to
understand their difference
is a
classic example of the
problems facing all societies
today.
Lesbi a n-fe m inism is one
attempt at explaining and
supporting this difference; as
such it provides us with
a
'case study', if you will,
0 f the strengths and
weaknesses of communitarian thinking
in the twentieth
century

^

-

^^^^

^
^

.

If it can be said that there
is one primary

influence behind this dissertation,
the influence must be
that of Michel Foucault.
I have fought with
Foucault (in
several senses)
continue.

for years; this battle will surely

His work has been called anarchist by
some,

latently reformist by others;

I

will not,

cannot assess

those charges here

P-vided

.

„ hat

r

wm

^

suggest

us wlth . new set
o£ questiQns

^

^^

^ ^
a

Perspective on powe r an d
language an d action
that is
sorely needed if we
W p are
sr-o to
progress in our thinking
about
community and liberty.
i n maklnfI
in
making these questions
y.
my own,
I Perh aps use
Foucault for purposes he
would not
sanction.
However, the range of
appropriation and
recognition of one's work
by a diverse group
is surely an

^

inciter

of the power of one's
thought,

out of one's h ands

.

„

x

have tamed

^

as well as being

he

^

certainly energized and r a
dic a iized me; wh at
higher
tribute c a n a teacher receive?
I

do believe that the years
ahead will se e a

growing body of work on the
connection between Foucault
an d the great stream of
Protestant Enlightenment thought,
as well as the French liberal
tradition.

It is my aim in

the work at hand to reclaim the
Augustinian impulse that
gives rise to liberalism while
pruning the modern

branches of positivism and privatization.

These growths

give rise to theories that acknowledge
what they neglect;
my hope is that we might find some
vision that can do
justice to all the needs (if not all the
wants) of humans
and their home.
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CHAPTER ONE

LIBERALISM AND ITS
DISCONTENTS

V

3 PUbUc
Philosophy;
P
its
hi
„
the0ry ° f
justice on the
the incompatible claims
that can be ffTT^''
°""ded on
an appeal to the
interests n/^K
f the "dividual
(the only basis of «
^
acknowledges) - the^dericie^ llberalis ™

c« needs^^e^

dS2

or

co^tinVS^Lt^^??"--

«-

...the crucial moral
opposition is between

lfferenCes) extend beyond
eth
,
mor allty
to the understanding
of
human
10n/ S
° that rival conceptions of the
social sciences, of their
social
limits and
iSS
Sre intima tely bound up
with the
5
antagonistic
confrontation of these two
alternative ways of viewing the
human world.
!

^

an^

'

Is the contest of modernity
that between Aristotle

and the liberals?

collapsed?

Virtue

'

Why hasn't the liberal order

And why does Alasdair Maclntyre,
in After

introduce Nietzsche, the renowned
critic of

liberalism, as the worthy

-

the only

-

opponent of

Aristotle?
For Americans, the conflict between
those with

agendas for the good life, the good society,
and those
who oppose any such public program is a basic
struggle of

P ° litioal

Ufe
-

VariSd

f ° rmS

—

tu.

*-

- *

—

struggle has had

engenders sorae
tyrannies even as it
aispiaces others; free
speech i s
both liberating an d
threatening, to in di vi
duals and t „
societies.
In the iate twentieth
century, i iberalism
appears as an incoherent,
alienating
ailenatl
ng, k
boring doctrine; at
its best a compromise
position
v
i>.u:ion, at
atit-* worst
its
a mask for
the raany faces of power.
•

'

It is this evaluafcion

^

leads Maclntyre to
counterpose Aristotle and
Nietzsche.
He beiieves, as do many,
that iiberalis m in any
f orm is
rationally indefensible and
that therefore the only

alternatives are a return to
Aristotelian ethics and an
open irrationalism, the
triumph of
will over reason:

••there is no third alternative
and
particularly there is no alternative more
provided
by those thinkers at the
heart of the contempP
orary conventional curriculum
in moral
philosophy, Hume, Kant and Mill.
it is no
wonder that the teaching of
ethics is so often
destructive and sceptical in its
effects upon
P °n
the minds of those taught 3
.

To Macmtyre, the choice is
clear.

Between

a

return

to some pre-modern morality and
a world of "arbitrary

order and nihilistic resistance''^,
his vote is for premodern visions. But how are we to
construct such a

8

»°ra lity , given our
modern sceptlcism?

^

it

for us now to
construct an ethics
and pontics

simultaneously meaningful
and non-oppressive?
Before we embark on an
answer to this, we
must
satisfy ourselves that
the situation is
as dire as the
critics of liberalism
have F
painted
•„
Lea it
t« liberalism
lt
Is
in
fact the defective,
dangerous doctrine that
it may seem,
in the Anglo-American
world, liberalism is
still a very
viable philosophy, both
academically and culturally.
Lest we think that we
have seen its burial,
Anth ony
Arblaster reminds us that
-

,

d
Ctr in C ° Uld attraCt
the
of
fLrcr vitaf,
tierce,
, ?vital hostility
which liberalism oft- P n
C ° mplete -ach^oniL
ToiTl
Totally
dead doctrines - those with
no
significant hold over people's minds do not
attract that type of hostility.
the
resumption must be, therefore,
that liberalism is
Ugh t0 be WOrth attacking,
or de

fdLdT

^

.

?ending?5

What must be discovered is no
longer the defects of
liberalism, but the source of its
tenacity in a world
that seems to cry for more than
liberalism can possibly
offer.

The strength of liberalism is clearly
not due

solely to the force of liberal arguments;
in its

9

clearest, analytical
form liberalism
liberal i. m seems
an impossible
basis for social
relations, just or
unjust.

Individualism

The core of liberalism's
problem has been its
metaphysical basis in an
individualism that isolates
us
from one another, both
as objects for
analysis and as

subjects engaged in social
intercourse.
In explaining
the connection between
ontological and ethical
individualism, Arblaster says
that the effect of seeing
the
individual as more 'real' than
society is to lend a

higher moral status to the
individual simply because
she
is an individual.
This reinforces the
atomistic
conception of society that is
behind liberalism.

Meaning at its simplest no more
than 'the
single human being', there is
almost invariably
an additional weight of emphasis
on the aspect
of singleness, on what separates
or
distinguishes one person from another,
rather
than on what one person has in
common with his
or her fellow human beings.
it tends
therefore to impute a high degree of
completeness and self-sufficiency to the single
human
being, with the implication that
separateness,
autonomy is the fundamental, metaphysical
human
condition. b
.

.

.

10

coincidence of cosmic
and individual
oivid 1 mo
me anmgs and values,
broke down under tne
the force
forrs of
nf emp lr e.
The retrieval of
Aristotle in medieval
Christianity was essential!,
an
attempt to return to
this orderly cosmos
and its
appreciation of the social
nature of personality.
The
breakdown of medieval
Christianity resulted in
the
collapse of that co smos
and its teleology.
Conceptions
°f the good that had
earlier been treated as
natural or
God-given were revealed as
excuses for violence and
domination

Within this shifting world,
the liberal project was
not a rejection of meaning,
but rather an attempt
to
relocate it in a place whose
reality could not be denied.
This place was the individual.
Whether through religion
or philosophy, through Luther'
s conscience or
Descartes'
cogito, the individual was
accorded ontological primacy.
Of course, the ease and comfort
with which this is

achieved depends upon how one conceives
that individual,
and especially upon the conception
and evaluation of
human reason.

For the Enlightenment, reason was
both

universally accessible and singularly directive;
that
the lack of a God whose revelation was

a

clear and

is,

11

reuable sou rce of public
policy did

^^^^

Possibility of what Michael
Sandel has referred
to as
"subjects capable of
constituting me anin on

g
thei r own
as agents of
construction in the case
of the right, as

-

agents of choice in the
case of the good. "7
0 nce
unshackled from prejudice
and tradition, h uma „
reason may
be counted upon to
find its way to
LO ceri-ain
certain universal
principles of justice.
•

However, reason cannot
provide a principle of
the
good - of a proper telos
for humans - without
violating
that which the deontological
liberal sees as the essence
of humanness - the capacity
for autonomous choice.
The
essential distinction between
liberalism and other

doctrines is its focus on the
will rather than reason
as
the decisive feature in human
life and dignity.
The fact
that 'construction of the right'
and 'choice of the good'
can be separated is indicative of
this.
The liberal has
a teleology,

but that teleology is rooted in
the will

the capacity for moral choice.

8

-

Because of this

difference, non-liberals can easily see
liberalism as

doctrine bereft of ends or standards.

a

Liberals

themselves have seen their project as antiteleological,

because it is opposed to organic or rationalist
schemas

12

society.

^

However, thls is .
misunderstandlng
'
COnCIete rSality f
°
«dual and her dcsires
is
ontologicall, an d ethicaXlv
prior t0 any construction
Qf
the g0 o d ; however,
thls reallty
_

'

^vi

^ ^

the focus on choice
so characteristic
of Protestants
and its progeny.

^

Utilitarian versus Deontological
Liberal ism

This primacy of the
individual led liberals in
two
directions, depending on their
epistemological foundations.
For the later British
empiricists, the only
ethics compatible with
liberalism was utilitarianism,

which hoped to eliminate the
seeming arbitrariness of
social teleologies by direct
appeals to individual
happiness.

The rationalist heritage of
the European

continent, however, remained tied
to

a

notion of humanity

based, not on desire, but on reason
and will.

while the

utilitarian ethic possesses the rationalist
virtue of

consistency in its attempt to avoid evaluations
of
desires,

it cannot provide a commitment to
justice that

prevails over public opinion.

13

I» contrast,

Kantian

l

iberalism attempfcs

fcQ

^

the p rimacy of justicg
in ethics
prwide a
ion
for individual
determination of the ends
of iife
Michael sandel explains
this:
t ho ug h it
Kantianis m]
rejects the possibility
of an objective moral
order, this
liberalism does
oes not
not- hold
b^in that ust
D
anything goes.
it
affirms justice, not
nihilism.
The notion of a universe
empty of intrinsic meaning
does not, on the
deontological
view, imply a world wholly
ungoverned by regulative
principles"*.
The problem then becomes
obvious: it is
"to find a standpoint
neither compromised by its
^

^

..

(

•

implication in the world nor
dissociated and so
disqualified by detachment "10
The Kantian needs to
provide an account of justice
that does not become an
account of the good while
simultaneously remaining above
the relativity and multiplicity
of particular
.

preferences.

The public realm is the realm
of freedom,

but in a distinctly non-Aristotelian
sense.

Charles

Taylor describes Kant's conception of
the point of

politics as "the regulation of external
freedom, in

a

consonant with morality, and therefore inner
freedom.
Not that political structures can hope to
realize this
latter.

That is quite ruled out... since law can never

way

14

direct stives, and „
e must never try

.

^^

organize external freedom
in Keeping with
the basic
beings

.

"H

While this is not the
place for a full exposition
of
Kant's liberalism, some
points are in order. The
basic
Premise of moral thinking for
Kant is that "human
beings
are rational agents. As
such, what they must
be accorded
above all is the respect
of being treated as
ends and not

just as means.

.

.

but to respect a being as
an

originator of ends is above all
to respect his freedom of
action. "12 The withdrawal of
God from the public world
does not, for Kant, eliminate
meaning.

Rather,

it frees

us to recognize the essential
dignity of humans.

The

fundamental fact in a disenchanted
world is the capacity
of the human to originate ends, to
choose and to act.

Any politics that obscures this by
reliance on
substantive concept of the good is ipso facto

a
a

violation

of human dignity.

This charge tells against utilitarianism
as well as

against any Aristotelian doctrine.

happiness is to sneak in

a

telos,

To prioritize

however loosely formed.

15

If our goal is to
resoect th» rfr ed
°™ of
originators of ends then
f
ly
ground on
which we can restrict
t eed ° m
agent in
° f one su <*

T

our attemot \l t
harmonize it tith the "fconcrliation is to
°f
Ha P"
Piness cannot
° therS
f
SUCh
restriction.
No n
ha PP^oss can be,
because to overrule6 hi,
of those of soLone
e
e

£ \ Sustm^™-°
L

'

f

°^t
2 --"he ^ to

^•to^IcTS^

11

"

Xter^LXr^ln^afhis1 ^

would be to
happiness consists.
agent. 13

This won!

ri

\Z

tUS as a free rational

While happiness may be
the goal of each individual
(or it may not), to a
Kantian liberal it has no
more

priority in political debate
than does any other
individual choice.
The individual capacity
for choice
remains the fundamental value,
the unacknowledged telos
of liberalism.

This telos demands that each
be left to

decide for herself what her desires
and ends are.
While Kant's liberalism appears at
first as

a

fortress for individual dignity and
freedom, it has

suffered the fate of most distinctively
modern political
theory.

m

attempting to eliminate the grip of tyranny,

liberals of all persuasions find themselves
losing also

their grasp on community and on morality.

The immediate

16

consequence of ontological
individualism is t0
problematic social relations thus the eternal
recurrence of contract
theory in liberal

thought.

tract theory serves both
to provide

Con-

a

description of
social relations and to
ground arguments for
particular
forms of those relations.
In the most powerful
contemporary presentation
of

contract theory, John Rawls
has argued that we must
distinguish between persons
as private beings with
"attachments and loves that they
believe they would not,
or could not, stand apart
from", who cannot imagine
themselves apart from "certain
religious and philosophical convictions and commitments"",
and as pubUc
agents whose sense of self has
no grounding in particular
social matrices.
However, Michael Sandel argues

convincingly that "the deontological
conception of the
self cannot admit the distinction
required. Allowing
constitutive possibilities where 'private'
ends are at
stake would seem unavoidably to allow at
least the

possibility that 'public' ends could be constitutive
as
well.

Once the bounds of the self are no longer fixed,

individuated in advance and given prior to experience,
there is no saying in principle what sorts of experiences

.

17

could shape or reshape
them/

^

^

guarantee
'Private' a nd never
-public events cQuld
conceivabiy
decisive "15

^

.

The li beral wh0 cannot
adm t Qf
.

a

^^^^

constituted self may retreat
retreat- i-„
to utilitarianism,
hoping to
conceptualize human relations
along abstract but
inclusive lines.

Charles Taylor explains:

UitarlaniSm haVS
for it.
lot
lofoffhf
of things undoubtedly:
its seemina
9
compatibility with scientific
though"
its
this-worldly humanist focus
it,

A

™

S th6Se WGre und
erstood in
Tni^fT
intellectual? culture nourished
by the

the
elistemological revolution of the
seventeenth
d
Y
SCientifC
P-tl y
f ro m J??

—

s™

litar ' an P ers P ecti ve, one
an ethi^!
ethical position by hard evidence.validated
You
count the consequences for
human happiness of
0
C ° UrSe
and ° U 3o wi?h the one
with the highest favourable y total.
What counts
as human happiness was thought
to be something

^^^^

'

conceptually unproblemat ic, a
scientifically
establishable domain of facts like
others
One
could abandon all the metaphysical
or
theological factors - commands of God,
natural
rights, virtues - which made ethical
questions
scientifically undecidable. Bluntly, we
could
calculate 16
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However, as mentioned
before, this choice
is not
available.
To the extent
we

^

^

theory, we agree t0
conceive of one another
as potential
-ans to happiness. Whiie
this has the attraction
of a
certain pessimistic realism
about it, it has not
been
possible to reconcile this
vision with the demand
for
individual autonomy and
respect. And so the
liberal is
stuck, as Arblaster
points
out:

to libera!

f

i„S™dufusm?

^^

Yet at the same time
there is another strand
within liberalism which
asserts and reasserts
that the individual is
naturally egoistic and
therefore tends, as Wolff has
rightly pSiitS
out, to treat other
individuals not as enSs
but as means to his or her
own ends.
0f
course it is possible to resolve
this'
contradiction by jettisoning one
or other of
le ents
But an individualism or
ego5™
^ abandons
^
ism which
the principles of equal
rights and respect for the human
person
is
certainly no longer liberal. While
on the
other hand the abandonment of
psychological
egoism requires a reconstruction
of the theory
of the personality and human
motivation which
liberalism has never undertaken. So
the
contradiction remains. 17
'

^

-

What exactly does Arblaster mean when
he says that

liberalism requires

a

'reconstruction of the theory of

the personality and human motivation'?

in the effort to

19

^^

avoid substantive
teleology,

^

to abstract itself
from any conceptions
of human nature
or psychology, lest
it sneak in ideas
of tbe proper ends
or conduct of Ufe.
The demand f or dignity
and rights
taken to be co m pletei
y independent of the
particular

^

character of the individual

-

in tact,
i"
fact

Hh.
liberalism

as a

political doctrine cannot
aiiow it«i
allow
f any
„
itself
concern with
individual character. However,
this avoidance is possible only at the price
of incoherence and
irrelevance.
Any attempt to justify
individual rights must be
based on
some notion of what it is
in us that commands
respect.
And this notion in turn must
act as a prescription,
an
injunction upon us to build our
lives and our society in
such a way as to foster and
develop those features. 18

Attempts to avoid this logic of
rights by making some
abstract idea, such as the capacity

for rational choice,

the basis of rights cannot reflect
any concrete

connection with actual policies and
choices in political
life.

That such a liberalism is only
incidentally

liberating is evident in Kant's acceptance
of the need
for total obedience to the state on the
part of the

individual, even when the state is oppressive.

The

Kantian freedom to choose becomes immediately
either the

:
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freedom of the Stoic
or that of the
libertine
retrieval of inner di
g ni ty amidst t y rann
or
y
any responsibility
within society. Kant
,

-

a

a

denial of

falls off the

Stoic precipice, and
when he tries to scramble
back over
the edge, his grip
is repulsed by
it is who says out
loud what so many were

(and are)

thinking, but afraid
u to sav
say. t-w
that humanism is nihilism,
that liberalism is a
doomed aLLempt
attempt at the
fh, survival
e
of
meaning.
v,

The Endurance of Liberali
sm

In his attack on Kant,

Nietzsche provides us with

a

perspective on liberalism that
has since become
ubiquitous
inferior in his psychology and
knowledge of
human nature; way off when it
comes to great
historical values... a dogmatist
through and
through, but ponderously sick of
this inclination, to such an extent that he
wished to
tyrannize it, but also weary right away
of
skepticism. .a delayer and a mediator. 19
.

In this statement we can find the
charges that today

are levelled at liberalism: its faulty
ontological,

epistemological and psychological foundations; its

21

^

abstraction an d ahistoricity;
its ambiguity and
lack Qf
inspiring force.
Liber a lism is indeed
the
theory of scepticism,
but it:
it is a scepticism
which is

^

continual referring

to ideals

•

^

, most
surely the strangest
sort of thinking to
be seen.
This strange thought
has, however, an
enduring
appeal to moderns.
Ita appeal

springs<

the fundamental dilemma
of modernity

-

,

^

^

the sense that

something has been lost,
coupled with the fear of
getting
it back,
our alienation - from
ourselves,

another,

from God

-

is real and painful.

from one

The

i

iberal

sees clearly, however, that
this alienation cannot
just
be transcended or eliminated
by the re-constitution of
society.
Once sundered from a source
of intrinsic
meaning, humans can only pretend
to return to unity and

purpose by suppressing and oppressing
that which is not
part of the scheme. The 'glassy

essence' of reason and

truth is produced at the expense of
constructions of the
Other that lie in wait beyond the borders.
The liberal

focus on choice is an attempt to retain
the awareness
that beyond Otherness is humanity

still an agent, the homosexual

a

-

that the patient is

citizen, the prisoner a

22

human being

" and that thi *

sort of acknowledgement.

—

ity lays claim t0
sorae

Thus we see that
Maclntyre's conclusion,
though
perhaps accurate logically
speaking, i s fundamentally
mislead.ng.
It may be true fchat
for modernity
lies between some sort
of Ari
^t-nt-^i
Aristoteliamsm
and something
else.
But to see Nietzsche
as the final
representative
of that 'something else'
is to concede the
nihilism that
he recognized as a
constant threat for Western

^

Philosophy.

Nietzsche and Aristotle would
be united in
their disdain for liberalism,
and on sur pris i ngly
similar
grounds.
Liberalism asks us to cenave
,•,
behave as if
we agreed on
ends, but only short of the
point where we betray
ourselves; and it hopes that the
point of betrayal is
beyond the points of necessary
social
intercourse.

To the totalist, the metaphysician,
whether

teleological or psychological, this is
the liberal, on the other hand,
focus of concern.

a

naive hope; to

it must be the constant

Hence the liberal is forced to sift

and re-sift, weigh and reweigh, explain
and justify again
and again.

in this,

she angers those who demans a

complete and logical answer, as well as those
who want to
be done with deliberation.

To those who are,

in Mill's

23

words,

"destitute of faith and
terrified of, skepticism",
v
the liberal lives in
bad faith or lalse
f a i« o
consciousness;
-luctant to make final
choices she

^

,

^^

to the need to reassert
community and order,
thus failing
to give these issues
their due.

The truth is that the
li beral agenda

t,

simply

Afferent than the non-iiherai,
however often the two may
meet.

On this agenda, the
top is always reserved
for
individual rights and choice;
or rather, the
individual's
rights are prior to any
issue on the agenda, high
or low.
And this reservation would
annoy Nietzsche just as
much
as it would Aristotle.
This reservation is indicative
of
the location of meaning for
the liberal, and it
suggests
that this meaning is just as
real to her as the good
life, God, or the will to power
is to another.
It may be

incoherent, as Taylor suggests.

It may be used to mask

the flow and absorption of power,
as Foucault

demonstrated.

Yet it is meaning nonetheless.

The Limits of Liberalism: Oppression
and Identity

If liberalism is not premised on the
destruction of

meaning, however,

it is surely reflective of the loss of
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some shared values
and
goals
° goals.

liberalism functions as

a

m

* ontological
its
form,

met a -th
0„
meta
theory,
an argument about

what we should include
in political
discourse which
becomes explicit in its
attempt to draw a line
between
Public and private matters.
The importance of
this line
is peculiar to liberalism,
and it opens it to
attack from

disintegration of morality and
tradition, of shared
understandings, as une
the result
r^nit- of public
neutrality; on
the other are those who
perceive
bcive tne
f
the play
D i a » of
nf power, the
"eight of established concepts
and discourses within a
context that denies them.
Sheldon Wolin
puts the

problem thus:

Qre t0 ima ^ ine two intelligent
readers
S
aCh SqUally diStant from him
in
fh 'r
time, the
first representing the middle
of the
fifteenth century, the other the
middle of the
nineteenth, we would naturally expect
each to
make radically different criticisms
on some
points, but we might be less prepared
to find
them agreeing on others. Our
fifteenth-century
reader would be shocked by Hobbes'
sardonic
treatment of religion and the ruthless
way he
divested political philosophy of all
traces of
religious thought and feeling. The nineteenthcentury man, surveying Hobbes from the
vantage
point of Marx and the classical economists,
would pronounce him utterly lacking in any
understanding of the influence of economic
factors upon politics.
Both criticisms would

11

7vZ

tLf

25

Yp^YlitTYY

achieved
C
off religionist
s tL
of economics. 20

H ° bbeS had

310

e^^LSremainin g
e

^

1"5

innocent

Since Hobbes first wrote,
writers have examined
one
or the other side of
this conundrum. Today,
however,
these two diverse criticisms
are increasingly being
bound
together, most prominently
in the wor K of

^

WoUn, Strauss,

Connolly and Maclntyr e 21.

The modern

Qf

^

power rush to fill the gap
left by the absence of
traditional norms, and the forms
of modernity are the
varying compromises and conquests
effected between these
two.
unable to restore historically
spontaneous unity,
moderns attempt its imitation
through denial of disunity
or the scientific explanation
and destruction
of

diversity.

However, denial cannot do the
job; for those

upon whom unity is pressed are
irrevocably aware of their
fundamental divisions.
It

is for this reason that much current
study is

focussed on groups and issues not long ago
thought of as

peripheral to politics.

Thus,

thought some of the issues

brought up by racial and ethnic minorities, gays and
lesbians, and women have not been readily addressable
by

26

~

^
^

conse-

both for the politicai
strategies Qf
and for our related
understanding of polltics
and
Political.
The liberal bases
pQiiticai
a
hopes on a clear
demarcation between the
political an d
social, the public a
nd the private.
The experiences
of minorities in the
last thirty years have
illustrated
the shortcomings of
such theoretical
demarcation.
In
particular, the struggles
of sexual minorities
have
revealed and made problematic
the connections between
public policy and morality,
political theory and ontology.
The arguments in these
struggles center directly
around the nature of the
human self. Every
theoretical
and social construction
provides some answer to the
s

^

questions: can we say in what
humanness consists? If so,
in what does it consist?
What are the responsibilities
of actors - public and private,
individual and corporate
- given this standard?
What sort of society is required
in order for this humanity
to manifest itself?

Liberal individualism parts with other
theories when
it posits the capacity for judgment
and choice as the

central feature of humanity.
cannot

-

dare not

-

Its insistence that we

say anything definitve about
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—ess

ieaves both an opening
for individual
definition and a Mac,
hole for publ ic
vacation,
community an d mutual
responsibility.
The Hegelian
against this void is
being manifested today
in the
construction of new sociai
ontoiogies and teieoiogies
which attest to provide
a stronger ground
for the seif
The awareness that
something is missing in
modern liberal
societies has combined with
the perception of
injustice
and pain to produce a
plethora of critiques and
visions
for fulfillment.

^

The centerpiece of these
critiques is the category
of oppression.
Oppression is a word with many
contexts
and shades, and it is precisely
this ambiguity that gives
it its power.
To the political theorist,
oppression
consists in "the systematically
unjust exercise of

authority or power over
However,

a

person or group of persons". 22

in other usages oppression
refers,

not primarily

to the actions of others, but to
the psychic condition of
the individual.
To be oppressed in this sense is
to be

shaped by oppression, to be stunted by
the weight of the

burden placed on one's shoulders.
always result from state action.

This burden does not
it

issues,

rather,

the entire social matrix of which politics is
but

a

from
part.
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this br0 ad sense,
oppression involves the
denial of
one's own voice through
the i mpos ition of
an external,
alien standard for the
interpretation and judgraent
of
one's thought, action
and being.
The problems and
issues involved in the
category of
oppression are man ifold.
When does another's
opinion
impose on me? what sort
of power must be
involved to
make this imposition
oppressive? How are we
to correct
this situation: is it a
matter for political
action, or a
matter for education and
social discussion? Are
there
perhaps many places to deal
with aspects of the
problem?
In large measure, the
attractiveness of the notion
of oppression is due to
its ambiguity.
This flexibility
allows for a much more personal
analysis than that
allowed in liberal theory.
Liberalism's historic and
philosophical tie to positivism has
resulted in its

dismissal by those whose feelings
of being oppressed
cannot be located in consensually
and systematically

verifiable injustice, and whose claims
have been rejected
on that basis.

Lesbians are one group among many that perceive
and

protest such felt oppression.

Clearly their sense of

oppression is not operative solely at the level of laws,

.
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i. derlved everywhere
from a cuifcure

heterose xuality as the
biologlcal

or-

stan da r d

,

^^^^

psycholQgical

^

Lesbl ans are silenced
by laws defining
their sexual hehavior
as criminal; they
hiding on the job in
housing, in custody
elsewhere; they are ignored
by tax and
These issues and others
are inore a sin gly
comrao n topios
for legislation and
debate within the U.S.,
in a w ay
reminiscent of the civil
rlghts battles Qf blacks
women
.

^

,

^

^

Also reminiscent of these
struggles is the further
awareness of many lesbians
that their problems go
beyond
laws and public policy to
the core of social
structure to language and the construction
of self.
Beginning with
the realization that self-respect,
an essential
ingredient of happiness, has been
denied them by virtue
of definitions and perceptions
of lesbianism and
homosexuality,

lesbians began the fight for an
identity

that would lend itself to self-respect
and pride.

in

this process, attitudes and choices have
emerged that are

characteristic of much American political argument,
and
the failure to date to produce

a

satisfying theory and

program for lesbian action is reflective of the failure

of modern Dolit-iVai
Pol^cal thrnking to return
us to a safe ho me
the world.
The stru ggle between
the desire tor a
,

•

«

secure social teleology
an d tne awareness
of the price t
>e Paid for such
security is be i ng
played out within
lesbran community
(communities?)
as it is, over and
over, within the
American polity as a
whole.
It would be a Mistake,
however, to assume
that
noth ing has chan ed.
g
In a perceptive
&
Goldwin has noted that
Americans are a people
g iven to
moral thinking about
public issues, so that
we can be
enlisted in causes not
directly our own, and
sometimes
even in opposition to
personal interest, if we
are given
a convincingly
principled argument. 23 This
is indeed the
case for minorities and
women, who made ready
use of the
American belief in equality
and opportunity.
The case is
not so simple for gays and
lesbians, however.
this
instance, heterosexuals are being
asked for a number of
things.
First, minimally, they are
being asked to

^

,

^^

m

tolerate a group which is distinguished,
not by obviously
inherited traits, such as race or sex,
but by behaviors,

and moreover by behaviors which are
widely believed to be
immoral or pathological in the Judeo
tradition.

-

Christian

The claim really goes beyond this, however.

.

.
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What is asked is
not Dust
iust t-w
that uhomosexuals
be left alone
ignored by law; it is
that society at large
la
reorient its
understandings and opinions
Pinions of
nf h„
homosexuality, abandoning
its traditional
distaste and distrust.
The awareness of
the psychological
experience of oppression
leads to a
remand that the social
context of such
experiences be
removed

Such conflicts are nothing
new in Western history
Every change in attitude,
in culture, in

Ze^ist

is ef-

fected at least in part by
conscious struggles for
specific rights and privileges.

However, the self-

conscious use of political
metaphor and imagery in an
area that liberalism has
ordinarily reserved for private
life has led to the adoption
of strategies and arguments
that seem to transform the
topic
seriously, even,

perhaps, dangerously.
What do
I

I

mean by 'political metaphor and
imagery'?

am referring to the reconception
of traditionally

'private'

standing.

issues in terms of power rather than
underThe phrase 'the personal is political'
marks

the rejection of any simple division
of realms, seeking
to deny the distinction between private
and public

motivations,

interests and contests and to expose the
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Play of power in
persona! an d social
regions.
Points the power is
visible
direc ^
t

^

•Wlity

^ ^ ^

Of a ps ych iatris t
to commit .

institution against her
will.

COmPSlling P ° Wer h
'

™

is
<

lesMan

At uuners,
others

level of gossip and
harassment.

At some

^

^

^

itit
is on the

The
ine most intriguing
,'nt
and

^at

whrch operates within

discourses and languages
to structure and
organize our
Perceptions, thoughts and
judgments.
Such a power is
particularly insidious because
it is so hard to
see.
Once seen, it becomes
the most obnoxious,
because it is
so immediate and invasive.
The most revolutionary
work
in lesbian-feminism
has been focussed on
these points of
Power: in psychiatry and
psychology, in heterosexism
in
language, in the visual
language of pornography.
This
work has been based on and
has contributed to theory
and
Philosophy in diverse areas Foucault's analyses of the
diverse and minute loci of power,
phenomenological and

hermeneutical discussions of the
constitution of self and
language, and critical theory have
all fed and been

developed by the analysis of the status
of lesbians and
gay men.
As with oppression, we must note
carefully the

import of this 'political' understanding
of society. A
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effect has been the
critique and
authority beyond
individual conscience<
be
se
Particular authority
have proved abuslve
or
because the concept
of a uthority has
lost lts legitimacy
If the world as
presently constituted
admits of no

^ ^

^

^

^^

legitime

authority (and in a world
where authority ls
solely a mask of power,
the notion of legiti
maC y vanishes, , then either a
new world must

be built or we must

accept the fact of power
and become adept at
its
management. At present,
both responses are being
attempted - sometimes
simultaneously, and by the
same
person
These responses are made
at different levels.
One
is the level of vocabulary
and logic - of explanation,
definition and justification of
one's actions and one's
being.
The struggle of lesbians
and gay men has provided
us with a clear example of
the connections between

explanation and justification.

it is a

philosophical

commonplace that "the attribution of
virtue or vice to a
person because of a certain activity
or practice involves
some reference to the agent's state
of mind; and his

state of mind is in turn affected by his
own view of the

causes influencing and forming his state of
mind." 24
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Rar6ly

h ° WeVer
'

'

«

We

to such a

castration

of the politics
of explanation^^
that afforded
the experience of
gays an d lesbians.
In coming to see
that the psychiatric
establishment was conceptually
incapable of understanding
their lives as they
did, lesbians became acutely
aware of the need
neea of »n
all groups and
all individuals for
or access
acr P
i-„ »~i *
to
self-understandings that
allow dignity and
self-respect.

^ ^

«

The response to this
awareness is reflective
of
another level of the struggle
for a secure space in
the
world.
The phenomenon of a group
attemptlng a

conscious definition, explanation
and history is fundamentally a product of the
Enlightenment.
The rationalist
belief that humans can construct
an ideal society finds
one more expression in this
instance.
This is

particularly a temptation for Americans.

Nothing could

be more natural for Americans
than to believe themselves

capable of re-discovering and re-mapping
their world.

With this, there is the belief that
this can
must

-

-

indeed,

be done without the benefit of earlier
thinkers.

This is especially tempting for
lesbian-feminists, since

most earlier recorded thinkers were male
heterosexuals.
This re-enactment of the Cartesian drama
often leads to
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~t.

as the orlginal
,

new rationalists
engendering their own
as Rousseau bred
his Sa de
Later chapters
.

^

^

wifch fche

^

within the lesbian
community.
This process of
definition is part of a
larger
attempt to found a
community capable of
grounding
individual identity.
Just as the attempt
at explanation
must be performed
self-consciously as never
before, so
too the construction and
maintenance of a community
in
this Manner is a radical
development.
The implication of
any community is order of
one sort or other, and
so this
attempt to found community
is simultaneously the
erection
of a new order.
This order sometimes
clashes with the
prior commitments and
understandings of its members,
and
thereby introduces questions
about the connections

between morality and identity.

What is it to be

lesbian? What is it to be a feminist?

lesbian-feminist?

a

what is it to be

a

Is there a feminist ethics
that is

separate and distinct from other ethics?

What does

a

self-defined community do with those who
claim membership
while violating certain mores

-

and particularly those

who deny that their behavior is in fact

a

violation?
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What exactiy is at
stake in the definition
of
ThSSe

"ities,

°«

fro™ the partlcular

concerns of iesbians to
the g enerai roun d
g
of p olitical
theo ry , and the
struggles
of lesMans

^

^^

gri

^

with these issues are
ilinstrative of the bind
that
m ° dernS
is ** ^Pe that this
history of
lesbian-feminism will aid us
aU .„ understand ng
dilemmas an d resiiience
of liberaiism and the
problems tQ
be confronte d by those
who seek to dispense
with it.

»

.

^

CHAPTER TWO

MEDICAL DISCOURSE AND
THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM
One of the perennial
problems for political
and
social theory is how
sufferers can be so blind
to the lr
suffering when it is so
clear to theorists.
The expl anation always involves
some contrast between
an essential,
possible self ana
and the
the* arh^i
actual, incidental one,
whether the
lines be drawn on the
basis of ethics, politics,
religion, or medicine.
Plato imagined us huddled
in the
cave of ignorance; Marx
referred to the fetishism
and
reification that constitute the
alienation of capitalism;
Freud explained our repression
and avoidance of reality.
The solution always lies in
bringing the real self to the
surface of consciousness and
letting it speak and act
rather then accede to the false,
limited self.
To this
extent every ethicist, every revolutionary,
every

psychotherapist is

a

teacher, a guide to the true way.

They are each carriers of the power
that flows through

their discourses, the grammar that marks
off right from
wrong,

oppression from liberation, sickness from health.

They are united in their task of enlightenment
and
ordering, but in fundamentally differing ways.
at their disposal,

The means

the locus of action, and the criterion

of success vary from language to language.
41
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Medical Discourse

in modernity,

vantage.

the moral philosopher
is at a disad-

The peculiarity of our
era lies in its par-

ticular adaptation of the
diohotomy between truth
and
falsehood.
The scientific world-view
locates truth in
facts,

in correct apprehension
and perception of an

actual, external world.

In this system,

'facts'

are

separated from 'values'; facts
are events, conditions
capable of repetition and
verification through experimental procedure, while values
are shifting, with their
origin seemingly within the
individual.

The atomist

conception of the individual
discussed in Chapter One
results in a conception of individual
consciousness as a
'black box', only accidentally
connected to the world
around it.
This conception gives
rise to an under-

standing of values and emotions as
something unamenable
to public,

rational dispute.

The positivist split

between the inner and outer person, between
belief and
behavior, leads to

a

division between the realm of

values, murky and deep, and that of facts, perhaps
hidden

but always potentially available.

To such a mind,

truth
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and falsehood a re not
categories for va! U es,
out sole ly
for faots.
Truth beoo.es not a
property of things, or
acts, hut of ju dgm
ents and propositions.
in this view,
falsehood is reduced to
an incorrect judgment
or mistaken
Preposition.
The power of truth as
aietheia, that which
is dis-concealed, and
of falsehood as the
shadow that
covers ultimate reality,
is lost
To
To a scientist,

-

that something is not what
it xs
is

itself to be

-

^

-

„ hat it v,
what
has manifested

is to speak nonsense,

is revealed through
careful,

hole of positivism

-

to say

what something

'

is

'

verifiable examination. The

the question of the origin
of

hypotheses, categories, descriptions
that structure
examination - is unseen. The other
side of the

positivist's concern for facts is

a

remarkable obtuseness

and inability to deal critically
with questions that
suggest that the world of 'fact' is
socially constructed.
The consequence of the hegemony
of the scientific

view is that the philosopher must either
be willing to be
located with the other 'metaphysical'
disciplines
vestiges of medievalism

-

translate her ethics into

-

the

or she must find a way to
a

more reputable discourse.

Over the last several centuries, there have arisen
two

candiates for such assimilation: politics and medicine.
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Politics opens an avenue
by pointing t0
oppressionSj fco
unsatisfactory, inhuman
conditions; medicine
provides a
language of sickness, of
malnutrition and defection,
of
Perversion.
In modernity, politics
and me dicine are the
two primary sites of
social control
of the body.

Politics appeals to the
dignity of humans and the
needs
of the society, while
medicine argues about the
needs of
the body and the means
of its control.
Politics speaks,
as Foucualt tells us,
of sovereignty
and obligation,

rights and duties; it deals
straightforwardly with issues
of order and control.
Medicine, on the other hand,
is
the vehicle for a subtler,
more insidious power, the

power of health and of reproduction!.

Both discourses

appeal to 'facts', even as they
invoke values and ideals;
of health, of justice.
Both politics and medicine have
the appeal to grammatically assumed
social concern.

Such

concern channels and translates the
individual's

compassion and desire for a better world, and
so serves
to validate the power that flows through
both arenas.

Such power, being suspect, must either be
justified or it
must be denied

-

treated as nonexistent or unimportant.

The positivist rejection of metaphysics does not
lead

automatically to the revelation and celebration of the

.

Play of power, but rather
to the veiling of
power in a
new language. As
religion and metaphysics
become
suspect, science becomes
the new basis for
ontology and
teleology
in this denial of power,
medicine has the advantage.
This is so for two reasons.
First, it is intrinsic
to

our understanding of
politics that it is the
realm of
Power - that is, we define
power politically and define
politics in terms of power,
whereas medicine enjoys a
status removed from both,
sheltering itself under the
umbrella of the sciences.
Second, the discipline of
the
body that is marshalled by
medicine is so immediate, so

particular to us that we cannot
readily see it.
for this reason that Michel
Foucault

it is

saw the need to

trace and describe the development
of modern medicin e 2.
In discussing the increasing
drive toward normalization

in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries,

Foucault noted

that "it's medicine which has played
the basic role of
the common denominator.
one instance to the next.

its discourse circulated from
It was in the name of medicine

both that people came to inspect the layout of
houses
and,

equally, that they classified individuals as insane,

criminal, or sick." 3

In this process,

the direct,
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ethically-based reactions

fco

unaccepfcable behaviQr

^

to give way to
'treatment' aimed at
eradicating the
siekness, the disease
behind the s ymp to m s;
iUness became
an ontoiogical category,
fining the void left by
the
eviction of truth and
falsehood from the
individual.
This sort of ontoiogical
revolution is by no means

unprecedented.

Societies all adopt and
evolve standards
of humanity, of maturity,
of worth; and these
standards
all serve as channels
of power.
Such standards delineate
who may be ignored, who
punished, who hidden; they
also
designate those who may make
the judgments about such
matters.
The peculiarity of modern
psychology and
psychiatry lies not so much in
their maintenance of these
distinctions as in the shape they
give them and the

authority given their practitioners.

Murray Edelman

points out that "to label a common
activity as though it
were a medical one is to establish
superior and

subordinate roles, to make it clear who
gives orders and
who takes them, and to justify in advance
the inhibitions

placed upon the subordinate class." 4

5

:
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The Medicalization
of Difference

The adoption of this
model has been
particularly
relevant for those whose
behavior faiis into
categories

which are always
problematic.

What was once a si mple

-tter

of punishment or
acceptance has become an
invitation to colonization of
the mind and body of
the
deviant.
The medical model has
several implications.
First is the perception
of problems as individual
rather
than social.

ng
d hiS COnstant w °rk with
individuals
wnT^
,
who seem handicapped
subtly encourage him to
view human unhappiness as a
product of
individual disorder. Even if he
is
exceptionally aware of social forces
that
contribute to his patient's unhappiness,
the
Psychiatrist's orientation as a physician
tends
to distract him from dealing with
such forces.

T

The second aspect of medicalization
is its effect

upon popular perceptions of the patient.

explains

Halleck
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of as indent or
obvious
call him an alcohol^
control his
'

•

"ho'
however,

th0Ught
once we

S^.^S^^cj^

and negative consequences.

s

unLi:
unable

°

f

r

rs

On the one hand"

6

^

Fs^pSSiTS';;

to contain him impulses
q npl of
him as an inferior person
wh^is
because he lacks the autonomy
and control that
normal people have.
Thus, the community is
ions upon'him and
in rejecting
goring whatever he might try
to say?6
'

^"strict

The most constant and
prevalent of these deviances
is homosexuality.

Homosexuality enjoys

in modern society,

as Thomas Szasz explains:

a special status

How much homosexuality is dreaded
in our
society is illustrated by the fact
that this
condition is considered not only a crime
but
also a disease.
On the one hand, the homosexual may be treated as a sexual
offender,
while, on the other, he may be defined
as
mentally ill and subjected to involuntary
"hospitalization" and "treatment". Thus
changing an important moral and social problem
into a medical one has loosed on the homosexual
the sanctions, or the threat of sanction, that
psychiatrists are in a position to exercise
vis-a-vis mental patients. 7

8

.
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Homosexuality has this
status precisely because
of
the iocation of its
deviance. Not onl i s
y

«

it different>

is different at a
criticai point of social

organization: reproduction
of the species.
Because of
this location, the
pressure brought to bear
on homosexuals in Christian society
has always been tremendous
Whether the grounds be
religious, ethical,
political, or
medical, homosexuality has
been seen as a threat
to
society

Within this framework,
lesbianism has been a lesser
crime than male homosexuality.
This is perhaps due to
the relative impact of each
on the reproductive economy;
male homosexuals are abstaining,
refusing to participate
in the maintenance of the
economy, and
this cannot be

overlooked.

Lesbians, however, may still
become wives

and mothers, whether by choice or
by force.
times,

At some

lesbianism has been less troublesome
than

heterosexual adultery, precisely because it
has had only
a

marginal impact on the reproductive and
lineage

systems

.

Medicine has participated in this discrepancy.
has been done more by neglect of the topic than by

It

50

consent;

jus t as lesbians slip
through the sodomy
laws of many states,
so too do they slip
through most

clinical discussions of
homosexuality.

De i 0 res Klaich

century, lesbianism was
ignored by Western investigators." However, it soon
became a topic of medical
debate and, as such,

lesbianism began to be looked
upon (by the
medical profession) not as
a vice, not as,

^ t^?
dlS

e --WaS 3t this "ime that
t0 PaSS ° Ut of th hands
^
of God
and the courts and into the
hands of the
medical men - where they remain,
in one study
Y
or another, to this day. 9

b";

"

The conceptual consequence of
medicalization was

a

move from perceptions of lesbians
as evil to that of them
as sick,

demented, degenerate.

This move was usually ac-

companied by pleas for greater tolerance
and compassion
on the part of society; doctors and
patients have por-

trayed the lesbian as doomed, whether by nature
or
childhood, to an unfulf illing, immature existence.

This

plea is not only analogous to that made for the insane;
it is a plea for those who are seen to suffer from
a

particular insanity,
describes this:

a

certain illness.

Halleck

"

51

professional attitudes toward
homo sexual
behavior have probably not
helpeS
the
homosexual's plight... To
assert that th B
homosexual is ill helr^ n ~t
individual and
control his behavior; this
has
rtJ
detrimental
effect on both parties
homose * ua l who
believes that he iss 111I
?

^
^^U^t^^S
7
i-

2L

Z

feels more driven 3 nH
i«„
15
the PUblic
to
assume that at any time he
can be overwhelmed
d

E^^^^^S

assume^r^
vLw

'

to

that the homosexual is
potentraxiy vio ent^
Thus, the psychiatric
diagnosis leads to
r
S bSin9 PlaCSd on the
h °mosexual
th«t
that may be as severe as
those placed on the
rapist or murderer. 10

ifT

The political consequence
of this shift in paradigm

was a trend toward medicalizat
ion of what had been a
legal problem; however, this
movement has never been
completed, as the legal establishment
has fought to re-

tain control over an issue which has
been within its

purview throughout Judeo-Christian
history.

what the

legislators and activists can see is the way
in which
sexuality as

a

social issue slips through the cracks of

psychiatric diagnosis and treatment;
too,

it

is that reality,

that accounts for and clarifies issues that the

medical paradigm cannot seem to cope with.

To the extent

that issues of sexuality are seen as the province solely

of Psychiatrists and
psychologists, they are
handled as
matters of health. The
fact of the social

-acceptability of homosexuality
and lesbianism

is made

secondary to the 'disease'
or 'character disorder'
which
needs explanation and
treatment.
Further, this

prioritization is no longer
open to discussion, for
the
linguistic for™ of medicine
is that of a truth
beyond
politics, beyond compromise
or power, speaking from
the
truth of nature.
In such a form, struggle
is useless;
the protester reveals only
her own defects, her lack
of

understanding and development.

"The person who adopts a

non-middle class norm needs help
even if she or he does
not want it", Edelman asserts;
in fact, within the

medical/psychological paradigm, this
resistance is
evidence of the depth of the sickness.

Health and Freedom: The Liberal Dilemma

It is clear,

then,

that the psychological language

of health, development and maturity functions
in modernity as a teleogical language.

As such,

it has faced the

same challenges faced by moral language everywhere.

The

revolt of modernity is a revolt against a community that
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«

too total, too singular
for those whose
consciousness
i. not in unlson
with thafc Qf
ma orit ^
ian
xs that of differentiation,
of rights, of privacy
liberal is not consoiousl
y ai m i ng at the destruction
of
moral discourse; rather,
she seeks to preserve
it by
lifting its scope to what
is safe or certain.
This is
done by pacing m0 rals
and teleology behind
a door, where
they need not arise in
public debate,
it is this
closeting of m0 ral discourse
that challenges liberals
whenever it is seriously
questioned by the proponent
of
any more sophisticated
conception of society.
The arguments of the
1960s and 1970s over the
medical status of homosexuality
are replications of the
struggle between liberals and
non-liberals in every area.
From the outset, the
psychological community concurred
in
its judgment that homosexuality,
as any deviance, is
.

_

pathological.

^
^

Before Freud, questions were
asked about

the 'nature' of the homosexual,
and the answer was

primarily that of degeneracy
deformity and weakness.

"

-

of genetic,

constitutional

The Freudian language of

personality development attempted to remove
the stigma
attached to sickness, but the attempt failed;
as Philip
Rieff notes,

"any arrestment of natural development is
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Freud's basic definition
of illness"^.
since Freud
expiained homosexuality
in terms of arrestment,
the
conclusion is clear:
homosexuals are sick.
What are the consequences
of this conclusion?

^ ^^

li2m

m

2

Mark

Freedman lists "the
implications of the "sicknessmetaphor in relation to
homosexualityall homosexuality has
the same uniform etiology or causal basis;
homosexuality has a
definite "prognosis";
homosexuality can and
should be "cured"; and
homosexual behaviof is
undesirable and to be avoided like a communicable disease. 13

Various writers have suggested
that 'the homosexual'
is a creation of the medical
gaze, a 'type' with a
sexuality, 'homosexuality', which
is uniform and
deformed.

They further suggest that we
have allowed the
homosexual's sexual object choice to
dominate and control
our imagery of gay life and have
let this aspect of a

total life experience appear to determine
all its
products, concerns, and activities.
Once the type has been created,
be explained,

it can - it must -

and in depth psychology this explanation

takes place on the level of personality development.
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Daniel Levinson describes
how thisb exolan^n
explanatory process
selects subjects:

One of the most common
tendencies is to
introduce personality
factors in fhf I
thetical explanation of
device but P°"
that personality has
little
"o with the"
a
e
f Pr
iling
I^thifview
it is,
?t
if so to speak,
,
merely "normal" t-n ,n T
with group pressures,
"
but'to deviate L*

T

—
°f

re^ance'^r

Personal*

Many things are interesting
to the psychiatrist;
however, they become
noticeable as an object for explanation only when they deviate
from the unexpected.
Once they deviate, all the
force of medicine and science
must be brought to bear on
their examination.
if the

deviance is at

a

critical social nexus, its
existence

must be eradicated.

This does not take the form
of

repression or political injustice; it
is

a cure.

The

peculiar tyranny of the helping professions
stems, not
from ill will, but from the importation

of the language

of science, the language of fact rather
than choice,

areas of moral concern.

The essence of scientia

,

as

Michael Oakeshott describes it, is exactness and

precision of statement; this essence operates to "the

into
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exclusion of whatever
ambl9U ° US -" 15

t,

^

prlvafce<

her world, thescientist
is

bound to its constructs
and spools if sne
is to be a
scientist.
Personal understanding
and flexibility of
judgment gives way in me
dicine to a teleology
and a
reality that has no room
for moral choice
about
sexuality; and, just as
one cannot choose the
'right'

sexuality, but must grow
into it, so one cannot
make
Private judgments about
sexuality - the 'facts'
speak for
themselves, telling us all „
e need to
know.

The consequences of this
move were double-sided.
The turn to medicalization
at the opening of the
20th
century resulted in arguments
for tolerance and compassion for those attracted to
their own sex. Under the
sway of the idea that
homosexuality was an illness
rather
than a crime, sexologists such
as Krafft-Ebing argued
that homosexuals should not be
held legally responsible
for their desires, and should
not be persecuted for a

'condition' which "was not a consciously
chosen

preference"".

The work of signmnd Freud slgnlf icantly

extended this argument when he located homosexual
desires
within the more general framework of sexual
development;
this had the effect of suggesting that
homosexuality was
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not even a disease.

However, the liberalizing

i nfluence

of Freud and

^

sexologists was effectively
subverted in the United
States by "a growing
consensus in American
psychiatry
that the condition is a
serious psychopathology,
that it
in all cases produces
anguish and unhappiness
for those
so afflicted, that it is
clearly abnormal <not a
variant
of normal sexuality,, and
that, like all diseases,
it

should and could be cured. "17

In the

„

Qf practicing

American psychiatrists, the
psychoanalytic medical model
has functioned
not to provide greater
,

dignity and

respect for gays, but to base a
minimal tolerance upon
the acceptance of medical
authority over and medical
interpretations of their lives. Seeing
themselves as

victims of heredity or childhood,
lesbians and gays could
not afford to celebrate their
sexuality
and their

partners, to see them as the choices of
reflective
adults.

No matter how 'humanitarian' the
practitioner,

the discourse of medicine functioned
increasingly to

relegate homosexuals to second-class status,
minimizing
both the possible social importance of their choice
and
the extent to which individual problems might be

58

reflective of sociaX
attitudes and pressures
individual deformity.

^^

The Rejection of Liberal
ism

Most psychiatrists and
psychologists argue quite
forcefully that homosexuals
should have all the rights
and privileges of other
citizens, and they oppose
attempts to single out gays
for special legal
treatment.
While holding f irm to the
"psychological consensus" that
"homosexuality is a symptom of
neurosis and of a grievous
personality disorder .. .manifested,
all too
often, by

compulsive and self-destructive
behavior"18, most argue
that the illness is not itself
a public danger, that
treatment is mandated only when the
illness breaks out
into criminal behavior.
This argument is that classic
of
the liberal, an effort at containing
conflict by

eliminating difference from discussion,
and it fails.
With all their good will, with all their
compassion and
attempts at understanding, the history of the
gay

liberation and lesbian feminist movements begins

precisely with the rejection of the medical paradigm
and
its participants.
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^

eXaC

"y

15 thiS?

^

to this period,

homo Phxle organizations" and
homosexual individuals
sought out m e mo ers of the
psychiatric establishment
to
serve on boards of
directors ^nH
and to provide relief
from
their problems. An early
member explained:

^

«-

At first we were so
grateful just to have

come to our meetings;
obviously, J turned out
to be those who had a
vested interest
us as penitents, clients,
*
or

Thavl

patients
When somebody with
professional credentials
C
d eS
yOUr
that
t rexLte
rne
existence
nce of
:f your organization.
And then
when you went out and
approached other people
you could say that Dr. So and
So or the Rev
So
and So had addressed you; that
made you le^
t0 thSSe ° th
P-P^ whom you

"Sized

-

In order to maintain these
contacts,

the homophile

organizations needed, not simply to
invite 'reputable'
speakers, but to maintain a rapport
with them.

Toby

Marotta explains that the price of this
rapport was public acceptance of the professionals'
opinions:
To give their groups an aura of studious
detachment, the leaders refrained from asserting that homosexuals were as mentally welladjusted and as ethical as heterosexuals. To
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accommodate the views and
interests of involved
professionals - most
UbC
of
wh™
S
ot
w
hom
made
~ j
their
,

1

Wo
V

to

-i

-;

k

Sf^03^00

"^T

13 ^"'

Bering

they questioned the
traditional homosexual ttractivLess
of the gay subculture. 21styles Ind th„ morality
"

of^™
,

Thus TO see that,
ultimately, the price
being paid
by gays within this
framework amounted to
their selfrespect.
If they really believed
what was being said
about them, they could not
truly see themselves as
fully
human and adult; if they
did not believe it, they
were
living a lie to buy a minimal
protection. During the
1960s, an increasing number of
gays and lesbians began to

challenge the medical view of
homosexuality as "ugly and
dangerous and self-defeating" 22
.

They began to argue that the
'problem' of homosexuality was not the sexuality of
the individual, but
that, like the problems of other
minorities, there is " no

homosexual problem except that created by
the heterosexual society." 23
There were three responses to this charge.

First

were the conservative psychiatrists, led by
Irving
Bieber, Edmund Bergler, and Charles Socarides.

This

group was quite clear in its opinions, and they under-
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stood the issues

.

when challenged>

to accept homosexuality
as nor m al is "to
assault the

fundamental bulldlng blocks
Qf

^

aU

heterosexual bond and the
family that springs from
that
*«-.*« This is no smau
Batter<
indee

^

^^^

understanding, to sanction
homosexuality would be not
only medically unsound,
it would be antisocial.

in direct opposition
to this group lay the
radical

psychiatrists such as Thomas
Szasz, Evelyn Hooker,
and
Hermann Ruitenbeek, who had
long been
arguing that in

fact gays were an oppressed
class,
tion, whose illness

(if any)

subject to persecu-

was due t0 soclal stress

_

Seymour Halleck explained that
often "a person is thought
to be disturbed because the
psychiatrist or the community
doesn't know about all of the stress
that causes him to
view his world as excessively
oppressive. .very real
.

stress can be imposed upon someone
without him knowing
its source.

But he is not the only one who may have

difficulty perceiving the source of indirect
stress;
often those around him cannot see it at
all. "25

This

will be especially true when those around
him are

imposing the stress, whether in the name of health,
morality, maturity, or any other.

These psychiatrists
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could agree with their
conservative counterparts
that
heterosexuals had a big stake
in the

enforces

of a

heterosexual nor m; the point
of dispute was over
whether
that should continue.
To the conservatives,
the issue
was biological survival,
and it would be insane
not to
treat sexuality in such
a light;

to the radicals, the

issue was social organization
and conformity.
i„ this
light, the potential for
change and the room for
diversity were considerably
greater than in the first
case.
in opposition to the
'building block' argument,
Szasz argued that the question
was, "in sexual form,
the
classic dilemma of popular
democracy: How much diversity
should society permit?"26

Between the conservatives and the
radicals stood

a

group representing the classic
American response to the
classic dilemma of popular democracy:
the liberals.

The

hallmark of the liberal in this battle
is the position

which

a

radical labelled "a fundamental contradiction":

"that homosexuals are seriously mentally
ill and

compulsively driven by needs over which they have
no
control" while asserting "in the same breath that they

should not be subject to legal sanctions". 27

How can this be done,

Quite siraply

,

by separating

'P-vate' judgments, whether
medical, moral, on
religious,

from one's be i iefs
about 'public affairs,
i.e.
issues of government
and politics.
The liberal psychiatrist is in the
uncomfortable position of
all egiance t0
two competing world-views
- the
teleological and the
liberal, the Aristotelian
and the individualist.
This
dual allegiance is meade
possible by the fact that
the
modern medical view is not
explicitly, self-consciously
teleogical, but rather is
itself a child of the
split
between 'is' and 'ought'.
This split enables the
doctor
or scientist to describe
phenomena in terms that suggest
rank judgments and moral
evaluations while denying that
these judgments have any
relavance for public policy
except insofar as they act as
a data base for political
debate.
The realm of the political is
sharply
(if not

always clearly) divided from that
of the medical, the
scientific

Because of this division, 'liberalism'
quickly became irrelevant to the discussion of
homosexuality in the

medical community, being dismissed by the main

antagonists as, on the one hand, insufficiently attuned
to the social implications of medical
judgments,

and on
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posed by open homosexuality.

The main partieg

fcQ

^

debate became, on the one
hand, the hardline
conservatives who found suoh
devianoe "to be sufficient
justification for involuntary
treatment and/or commitment", and, on the6 other h,nH *-u
° ther hand
the growing body of
gay
liberationists and lesbian
feminists who saw the full
implications of the medical
model.
Their reaction was to
begin to develop
counter-explanations of homosexuality
as
well as radical political
recommendations.
'

This

challenge began with the drive
to remove homosexuality
from the list of illnesses in
DSM-Ili, the American
Psychiatric Association's guide to
diagnosis and
treatment of psychiatric disorders.

The reaction of the

conservatives was predictable and
direct; however, the
issue was (and is) very difficult for
the liberals.

Their commitment to the medical paradigm
led them to

distrust of attempts to change judgments
by

a

a

political

rather than scientific process, but their
commitment to
justice and political equality fostered

a

sympathy with

the position of people whose lives were
distorted by
others' hatred and fear.

noted that

Writing in 1971, Dr. Halleck
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* Ctlvltles tending
to
strengthen the star^
medical or
neutral.
This
By reinforcing
Power the psychiatrist
is committing a
"hether
intends'tHAot
Oncf.S? *^
appreciated, the psychiat-r^fchiatrist's
search for political
neutrality
begins to appear illusory. 28

^^^^^
^

However,

'appreciating this fact' can
be harder than
Halleck acknowledges. Even
the psychiatrist who
can

accept that his judgments
will have political consequences need not, within a
liberal framework, assume
responsibility for that fact. Like
the physicist who
only designs the bomb, the
ontological and moral individualism of the liberal allows him
to distinguish

knowledge from its use, research from
development, fact
from policy.
Thus, the liberal becomes estranged
and
impotent.

Teleological systems do more than make
rules;

they provide a basis for identity, for
self- reflection
and evaluation.

They provide a universe of positive

meaning for our acts, while liberalism
is always forced
to fall back on other systems to
provide meaning even as
it insists on their limitation.

To the conservative,

the
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liberal is weak-kneed,
unable to face
race th*
the implications of
what he acknowledges
to be the truth.
To the radical
the l iberal is naive
about sclence
poiitioS(
conseguently not a reliable
ally.
The scientific liberal
cannot deny what clinical
experience an d othersresearch
suggests, n ame iy that
gays are disturbed and
that
ho.osexuality is pathological;
but neither can she
deny
that they are hu.an, and
therefore entitled to
the clai ms
of justice.
i

^

^

Once the door is opened to
the possibility that
homosexuality is not a crippling
social condition, any
lesbian or gay man is given
the option of self-respect.
However, that door cannot stay
open simply on the basis
of intellectual laissez-faire;
the medical perception of
the centrality of sexuality to
modern social order
seemingly can only be countered by
a theory that ac-

knowledges that centrality.

The liberal attempt to make

sexuality a matter of what people do
in bed does not have
the force of intuition behind it,
and consequently arguments based on such an understanding
get pushed off stage
by both extremes.
The fundamental insight of both gay

liberation and lesbian-feminism has been the
need for

counter-explanations of the role of sexuality in
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Personal^

organi 2a tion as

KeU

as social
Tne chellenge for both
is to provide these
explanations
and new standards in
a f ramework thafc

perpetu.te or initiate
oppression.
psychiatrists were (and are

,

^^^

The liberal

trying to he fait hful
to

truth and its judgments
while refraining from
any unnecessary burdens
in the
lives of gays

.

i mposing

while

.

fc

is easy to be impatient
with or co nd escen d ing
to those

who fail to gr asp
post-liberal soci a i theory,
it i s
impossible to dismiss their
good win and efforts
withQut
ourselves becoming the new
doctors, the new elites of
consciousness.
The fact that these people
are still

vocal and supportive of

gay'

rights suggests that they

have some insight or intuition
about society and politics
that we cannot ignore.
In subsequent chapters, I
will be

looking for that intuition that
makes the American
liberal such a hardy breed.

.

.
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CHAPTER THREE
LESBIAN-FEMINISM: THE
SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY
The clinical approach
to homosexuality
came under
in the late l 950 s
as lesbians and
gay men b e g an to
question the validity
v..
aiidrty „i
of „„
psychiatric
descriptions and
:u dgm ents of their
lives.
Clinical portraits
presented
formed, stunted develops
resulting in personal
tragedy and social
instability. During the
1950s gay

'

a

,

that their position was
analogous to that of other
groups
seeking recognition and
affirmation in American
society,

notably blacks and women.

Organizational efforts

blossomed, and with them
arose the perennial issues
of
social change movements: How
much change is needed? What
sort of change? How soon?
How is it to be achieved?!
At the same time, women's
liberation was developing,
both theoretically and organizationally.
Faced with
these questions, groups formed,
splintered, developed,

proliferated.

The call was for women, as women,
to

examine and change the structures and
relations that

burdened their lives.
The possibilities seemed infinite.

Before the

advent of contemporary feminism, politically
active
72

73

lesbians had been isolate,
from heterosexual
wo men
WhSther
Predo.inantly raale homophUe
organizations or active in
the Da ughters of
BiUtis
lesbians were acutely
aware that they
belonged to a
Population labelled
pathological, and that
they could
safely reveal their S f>xnsHf„
sexuality only to others
within that
population.
Indeed, Derore
before thp
th e feminism of the
1960s,
they would have little
b^ic
basis for non-economic
interaction
with heterosexual women:
the privatized lives
of most
women kept those who
worked outside the home
isolated
from those who did not.
The call of women's
liberation,
however, was to every, woman.
The energy of 'single'

—~' «

^

'

•

•

^

women and working wives
could now be shared with
women
who could meet at night or
on weekends,

and bonds could

form.

Previously bereft of vocal
communities, the late
1960s found lesbians with two.
The price of membership in
each was high, however.

Lesbians in the gay rights and
gay liberation movements
found themselves in the position
of women in the civil
rights,

anti-war, and New Left movements

-

conceptual

appendages and organizational housekeepers/-

secretaries/sexual partners. 2

m

the gay movements, this

conceptual annexation took the form of
denial by male

leaders that lesbians
faced
aced ornhi
om unique
problems
to them and
*- to their status as women; in
reactlon tQ
specific treatment of
the problems facing
society an d complaints
that these were
ignored by raale
hM ° SeKUalS
lead
'
that "the Lesbian
.sic,
IS, after ali, a
homosexual, first and
foremQst .
to all - yes aii of the problems of
and with no speciai
problem as a Lesbian (sic, "3
whUe
not caned upon to
provide sexual services
for the men
women in gay organizations
found themselves faced
with
the same assumptions
about coffee-making and
secretarial
duties as their heterosexual
counterparts did elsewhere.
The consequence was likewise
similar; lesbians began
to
see their sex as an issue
commensurable to, and perhaps
more fundamental than, that
of sexual preference.

^^
^

~

"

^.^

^^^^^

.

,

The influx of lesbians into
the women's movement was
not unproblematic, however.
The liberal feminists of the
National Organization for Women,
in particular, were

extremely uncomfortable with lesbian
claims of and
demands for solidarity; recognizing
the power of the
epithet 'lesbian' to discredit feminism,
and sharing in
the conventional attitude that
lesbianism was a 'personal'

issue separate from that of the public
status of

75

-en,

they tried tQ dQdge

1SSbianiSm

"

S ° me

~ ~« -

issue

^

ignoring

-PP°rtin g institutions
Rita Mae Brown
resigned from Now in
Ja nuary of 1970,
stating that

^

Lesbian is the one word thatthe
Executive Committee a
collerY Ve heart attack,
This issue is dism?,«Jf
^unimportant, too
dangerous to c
excuse could he
repression.
The prevailing attitude
PP ° Se th6y <n ° tice the «ord,
they)
frock ro
n droves?
H °» horribi;
t
Alter
after
111 fh
all,
think of our image. "4

S

« JL™

^

While more open to
discussions of lesbianism
and to
a lesbian presence,
radical feminists also
disappointed
the lesbians.
This disappointment took
two main forms:
first, the heterosexual
feminists developed an
analysis
of oppression and highlighted
issues which seemed to
focus on relations between
men and women as sexual and
life partners, which led
lesbians to wonder where their
problems fit with those of other
women; secondly, many
lesbians found themselves treated
as prospective sexual
partners and instructors by women
who were simply curious
about homosexuality and hoped
to experiment without

commitments or attachments.

The combination of these

reactions by liberals and radicals
led the lesbians to
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begin analysis of the
rplan™
relation v,
between their position
as
women and their status
as lesbians.

The Woman-Identified
Woman

m

1970,

at the height of the
debate within femin-

ism over the "lavender
menace",

a

group calling

themselves Radicalesbians
wrote

a

paper discussing the

implications of lesbi^n-icm
«
lesbianism for feminism.
•

.

At the second

Congress to Unite Women,
held at the beginning
of May
1970, "The Woman-Identified
Woman" was distributed
and
discussed, and the result was
a completely new
ground for
discourse about and understanding
of
lesbianism.

The centerpiece of "The
Woman-Identified Woman" is
its answer to the question,
"what is a lesbian?" The

answer is not to be found in
psychology textbooks.

A lesbian is the rage of all women
condensed to
the point of explosion.
She is the woman who,
often beginning at an extremely
early age, acts
accordance with her inner compulsion
to be a
more complete and freer human being
than her
society - perhaps then, but certainly
later cares to allow her.
These needs and actions,
over a period of years, bring her into
painful
conflict with people, situations, the accepted
ways of thinking, feeling and behaving, until
she is in a state of continual war with

m
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everything around her ,nH
With her
self.
she may not be' f
v
10
8
Political implications
° f the
oi jhar?n her
S
personal necessity but- nn
began as
S me leve l
not been able
she
has
?? ?
and
oppression laid on h^ \t
'

her and why it
it to do so. 5

i

^"^ions

St S °° lety has d
°"e to
„ =t"nal and
fun
necessary for
,

in describing
themselves thus,

the members of

Radicalesbians hoped to
convince their audience
of two
points.
The first is that of
political unity. Both
lesbians and heterosexuals
were painfully aware of
the
presence and effectiveness
of "queer-baiting" in
the
"omen's movement; such baiting
was what had given rise
to
the 'lavender menace'
argument in the first place.
Such

attacks served two purposes;
they increased public
suspicion and dislike of feminists,
and they kept fe-

minists divided among themselves,
with 'straight' women
fearful lest the lesbians make
them 'look bad,' while
lesbians became angry and alienated
from the women's
movement.

Therefore, the Radicalesbians hoped to
find

a

common ground within feminism for all
women by providing

78
a

theoretical counter tQ

understandingg

lesbianism.
The second point is
treated

theoretical

^

Paper, but the strategic

evident.

» The

^

in the

Woman - Identlf ied Woman „

^

radical fem inist lesbians,
and their ana lys is
shows their
-ots. The core of radicai
feminism
is the idea that
the

oppression of women is
"fundamental", that is,
that thrs
oppression is "cau<?an
a
causallyw and
conceptually irreducible
to
the oppression of any
other group»6
y uup
Tn „
,
In
contrast

^

to

•

those who analyze sexism
or 'patriarchy' as
a product of
capitalism or pre-liberal
attitudes, radical feminists
argue that the oppression
of women by men is
the paradigm
and the root of all other
oppressions and inequalities.
Radicalesbians utilized this analysis
to suggest that the
oppression of lesbians is the
direct result of the

oppression of women, and that it
most clearly reveals the
contours of that oppression, insofar
as the lesbian is
the ultimate pariah of male
society; not only

a

woman,

but a woman-loving woman, a woman
unattached to

a man,

being bereft even of an auxiliary
identity.

"For

feminists the main educational value
of lesbian baiting
has been its exposure of the very
clear connection in

a
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men's minds between
beingeing

-dependent.

-tie

the

threat

--tory

forming9

m

^

<~

a c

ively
yQu
Y
that you ar e
beginning to

of Womanhood
altogether,,
'

real woman'
wo
,

an d since the
only

SeXUal

and being

Being calle d
unfeminine is

repeatedly contrasted
to

-d,

w.
unfeminme"

° rientati -"'

«-

.

this culturp
ture,

"t-v^
the

9etfUCkSdbymen " 8
-

difference

^
—

^

^^

Radicalesbians concluded

essence Qf

"™

in the popular

&

^ ^

cal feminist focus

Preference' to p roduce
a comraon

heterosexual women.

fcase

^

^

^

The new analysis
carried within it
something more
than coalition, however
?h« conclusion
„
owever.
The
of "The WomanIdentified woman" is that
the basic structure
of control
over women is that of
sexuality, and in particular
the
requirement of heterosexuality
This is the structure
that must be rejected if
women are to become whole
beings
.

Radical feminism's early
analysis suggested that the
oppression of women was intimately
related to their roles
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that sex oppression
was basicallv
basically the
oppression of sex
role-bearers, and that
this could
com h be
k
eliminated through
the abolition of
such roles and the
16 even
eventual
tual appearance
of the 'an drogpous
person .

^

,

•

^^^^

,

arbitrary and stunting
expectations and definitions
This analysis did
not attack
heterosexuality as an
institution, but only
the 'unnecessary
necessary Hi
divisions between
men and wo me n that m
ade one's choice of
partner and
sexual patterns socially
significant^
Early radical
f6miniStS UVed
3
d of endless
possibilities and
Protean selves, and all l
imits . physical<
psychological>
social, legal - were
equally oppressive. Fre
•

^

•

—

edo ra lay in

being able to decide for
oneself what and who one
was,
what choices were appropriate
or fulfilling,

rather than

being told by cultural
representatives what being

a

wo.an

was about.

With the introduction of
lesbianism as
issue, however,

pressure.

a

central

radical feminism found itself
under

The agendas of lesbians and
of heterosexual

women are indeed different.

Lesbian feminists were not,

by and large, content to assert
that one's choice of
sexual partner should be irrelevant
to the quality of
one's life or one's participation in
society.

Though

81

many lesbians indeed
asserted, as did
Martha sheUey<
that "I personally
don't care who other
wo.en are
3leep ing „ lth , as long
as someone x
sieeping
-10, the earlier experience of
disapproval and
discrimination had left many
lesbians suspicious of
such
fine statements.

^

a

P r 0n
Y S Ck
be alS
don ™t :a re :ho sl ee
p s° w ith h
do outside of

betrLVcoun

*°

the *

S™"^'^

0"

homosexuals have been trvinrr r „
t St
raights
to understand for years
Wen
^
for liberalism.
eLa^e w^t'i d outside^?
y
n0tMng t0 d With
°
inside - Sut
SaiSe
but my consciousness
permeated with homosexuality. is branded
For years'
been branded with your label
for
fc

^

1

L3*

iL

The consequence of the
historical fact of branding
was the need for a theory
that could deal, not only
with
some ideal future, but with
the past; a theory that would

allow lesbians to feel at home
somewhere in the present
by explaining rather than
overlooking
their difference.

Radical feminism's focus on sex
roles seemed to speak to
the experience of gays, but the
sexism on the part of gay
men suggested to lesbians that the
problem ran deeper
than that.

Increasingly, the issue of sex-roles gave way

to that of sex itself.

While most were reluctant to say
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that men Eei_se were
the problera

,

aU

constitute, by heterosexist
society were
en emy
„ en - by nature
.

,

fay

problem.

,

^_^

^ ^^ ^

agreed

_

Not the least of the
advantages of this
treatment of
is
lt . eli m in a tion of a
~»
constant, na gging quest
ion
among f eminists: the

^^^^

^

answer can now be qiven
given «„i„K,f
straightforwardly: men must
take
care of themselves.
The priority
for women, the truly

revolutionary call of feminism,
must be for the union
of
women.
Rather than looking over
their shoulders, trying
to drag their men with
them, and limiting their
feminist
activities to what will not
destroy their relationships
with men, women are now called
upon to focus on women, to

renounce the privileges that are
part of involvement in
the dominant culture, in favor
of the freedom and new
identity to be found in the company
of women.

This new

life requires withdrawal from
the larger system on as
many levels as possible - economic,
spiritual, emotional,

Physical.

There is nothing to be gained, and
everything

to be lost, by collaboration.

Separatism, then,

is the order of the day.

This

strategy directly exposes the needs of
lesbians for
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"^"^
these needs as threefold.

—

»~adly, we can describe

First

,

the

interpretation and valuation
of igsbianism

c-e, second, leshians
need

^

^

to deal with the

of their existence
and participation
in society; and
«urd , a sense of history raust
be develo ped so
that each
woman does not need
to create
creafp a universe
of meaning anew
"The Woman-identified
Woman" waS the first
in a series of
theoretical and historical
statements attempting
to
.

,

^

eliminate alienation by
locating lesbianism
a
Positive framewor* - a
framewor* that is conducive
to
personal esteem and to
supportive relationships
with
others.
That framework is
lesbian-feminism.

The Lesbian-Feminist

A lesbian-feminist is not
simply

lesbian who is

a

also feminist; not all lesbians
qualify, nor do all
feminists.
The core of lesbian-feminism
is the position
that sexism and heterosexism
are "hopelessly intertwined", that the oppression
of women and lesbians is
"the prototype for all other
oppressions,

since the

oppression of women and of lesbians crosses
boundaries of

race,

class,

^

and age"12
9e

Th<
There

.

is,

too, the radical
feminist view of the
personal realm
dim as DO
>
Political;
"the
lesbian-feminist perceives
herself
seit as a woman
who realises the political
nature of ner
her choice
choir, to commit
herself
to sexual and
emotional
onal r
P aH n
w with women
relationships
and to
^ond with them in her
life,.13 The
lesbian-feminist is
a privileged
position; over
heterosexual feminists
she has the advantage
of consistency
between theory and
practice; over
'non-political' lesbians
ebDians she can claim
the superior awareness
of tne
or
the revolutionary
r*™im-«
nature of her
sexual choice.
The se claims were
in fact made
immediately - .„ you
•

•

,

t-

i

«

'

^^

lt

^

^

^

another woman, and that
includes physical love,
then how
can you truly say you
care about women's
liberation?^ and they remain a
centerpiece of lesbian-feminism.
It is thus clear that
lesbian-feminism rests on the

radical feminist collapse
of the political realm.
Feminists have shown that the
personal world, that world
left untouched by liberal
political theory,
is in fact

political, that is, riddled with
power relations. By
bringing this to light, radical
feminists hope to loosen
the hold of these power
relations over women by

countering them, by invading
their space with the

^course
thSmSelVeS

of freedom and
forcing
°r

PSriSh

-

^

justify

However, the
perception „ f

^

-to

the rejection of any
theoreticai pQsition
-tains a distinction
between the realms.
This has
e«ect both ef challenging
au privafce

Perhaps more dangerous,
of making
Politic, epipbenomenal,

^

^

^^
relationsMps

,

^

that is, making it
only the

-suit

of the power dynam
i cs existent

society,

incapable of being

a

^

iocus of an y real
change.

This coilapse of
poiitics results, then,
in the
perception of one's sexuality
as a Matter of
politics
not juS t at the level
of i rap ii cation .
certain
-y lead one to maxe particular alliances, to
view one's
public interests in a certain
way - but at that of

session.

By 3leeping with women,

lesbians express

their commitment to a world
that values women, and,
conversely, heterosexual women
reveal themselves as torn,
half-hearted victims not entirely
to be trusted.

One's

body and its desires become
a more reliable guide
to
one's loyalties than words or
public deeds.
In this
perception, radical lesbian-feminists
ally themselves
with the pattern of thought which
Charles Taylor has

Ml,

labelled

<

expressivism'

.

The central features
of this

reaction to the Enlighten.ent
picture of hu.ans can
auaaed up as 1, anti- dU
ali sm - the rejection
of any
division between mind and
u ooay,
bodv ?)
t-hm
2) the
valorization of
freedom, which
nicn is seen
c OQri as u
being "synonymous with
selfrealization" as tne
the central
rpnt-r.i value
of human life; 3) a
quest for union with naturpnature, and
3n n 4)
a\ a
drive for unity
with other humans. 15
Such a view rejects any
distinction between public and
private acts, seeing them
all
as equally expressive
of self.
acting/

U

•

,

i

<=;

.

,

i

m

in willing,

in desire,

,

in thinking/

we reveal ourselves as
that which

we are.

The rejection of the
public/private split, so
essential to feminism's insights,
has its roots in the

perception that the barriers between
family and community, economy and state serve
to veil power as much as to
protect individuals; or, rather,
serve to sanction or
overlook non-public power. This is
precisely the point
at which liberal psychoanalysts'

ability to 'defend' the

homosexual broke down, and the rejection of
the

distinction provided the opening for women to

problematize and challenge their 'private' oppressions.
However, the expressivist goes beyond problemat
izat ion
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and critique; in her
total reiectinn
rejection of any such
split
she removes an
y ground for . more
Of the relations between
public an d private
structures
and action, of the
gaps and spaces as
well as the
connections
in their expressivism,

radical lesbian-f em
inists are

in greater agreement
with their old opponents
than with

liberal

sympathies

.

The hysterical reaction
to

homosexuality rested in part
on this same belief
that
sexuality is expressive
of one's social being,

when she
says that she is "disloyal
to civilization", Adrienne
Rich agrees that her
existence is pointed toward
the

destruction of a culture and
a history that has
destroyed
women. Rather than
transcendence
of the old categories,

however, what we see in
lesbian-feminism is what
Nietzsche would call their reversal.
The lesbian-

feminist and the conservative
psychiatrist are in
agreement as to the facts; the issue
is one of valuation.
In The Will to Power,

Nietzsche states that "values

and their changes are related to
increases in the power
of those positing the values"^.
However, rather than
direct battle for moral hegemony, what
we today witness
is the proliferation of evaluations,

each reflective of

a

particular power base,
a local1 rH
„
dlscou
"e within which the
ee 3 of that
communlty
expressed
Qf
COmmUnlty 13
d to the revaluation
relnterPretati °" ° f

^
—^—
_

^

^

existence.

Just as

in the search for
truth and/or
an x/
as the discourse
of social
control of bodies,
so may lesblan
„™
lesbian f
feminism
be understood
simultaneously as the
reflection of a
particular

understanding of the
position of women, as
the theoretical formulation
of lesbian identity,
and/or as the
new logic of
inclusion/exclusion
with its own foci
for
control.
These perspectives
are not mutually
exclusive;
-deed, any understanding
or theory contains
the logic of
demarcation, and all
control beyond brute
force is
,

worlds.

The denial of any

on the part Qf

theorists serves today only
as the opening for
their
opponents' critique, while
the rejection of all
justifications for controls and
limits leaves us bereft
of any conceptions of
authority or meaning. Either
denial is an invitation to
nihilism.

One of the fundamental
contributions of Nietzsche is
his insight into the dynamic
of nihilism in the West.
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This dynamic has
its root ln
in the
search for
that transcends the
p he nomenal world _
metap hys ics.

^

^^
a

meaning

meaning and the
inabilityY to accent
accept a world of
Becoming,
of constant change
and struggle
ygie.
Th P n
The
opening move of
metaphysics, then, iss
to posit
nosit a meaning
that is
•

" 0rU:

^

be9inS

«

posited a totallty
a
,

systematization, indeed an »
any organization
in ail events,
and underneath all
events and
rf
events,
a soul that longs
to
admire and revere has
wallowed in the idea of
s ome
supreme for, of donation
and administration <lf the
soul he that of a
logician, complete
consistency and real
dialectic are quite
sufficient to reconcile
it to
everything,.. .17 Underneath

»

^^^^^

urge to deny win, t0
relieve

^

Qf

responsibility for coming to
terms with the world.
In the years since
the concept of the 'woman-

identified woman' emerged,

a

particular strain of

lesbian-feminist analysis has
developed which engages in
this sort of metaphysical
totalization The desire to see
the world as a seamless (if
corrupt) whole has resulted
in the revival of ontological
dualism - a new
.

Manicheanism, if you

win

_

treed fcom the
perception of

^^

»ith the,, lesbian-feminists
such as Mary
Raymond, and Sally Qearharf k,
y Gearhart have accorded men
the status
of ontological
oppressors, depriving
them of any
Possibility of fundamental

changed

things

That raost of

^

have emerged from
Catholic theological
schools
i. Perhaps no accident;
while affording the
possibility
of an alternative to
the poverty of liberalism,

Catholicism also carries
within it the impulse
to
understand the world in unitary
terms.

Just as the early

Church had to face Manicheanism,
so we now have to
understand the temptation to
divide the world in order

to

understand it.
The new ontology divides
the world into men and
women.
Men, it seems, are irredeemable;
they may struggle to break their own bonds,
but in so doing they are
fighting their own nature as
much as they are opposing
society.
The battle is too hard, the
fight too

exhausting, to expect any to win.

Jean Elshtain has

noted that "the radical feminist
portrait of man represents,

in some ways,

of women". 19

an inversion of misogynist views

The portrait is of a being diseased by

nature,

infected with what
Ti-Grace
brace Atkinson
At-v
labels
"
metaPhYSlCal
-is cannibal^ is char .
aC
"
iZed
thS nSed

T

^^

^

«« «- «*• of o PP ressor" in order to fill +-v,~
fill their inherent
void. 20 This is
extended by Daly wh
°
teri2es men as
demon ,,
sadists who live
Hvo ^-f-p
off women's blood
_,
oa> 21
Mrv(
Nothing
short of
re-creation can change
that.

—

'

..

.

Women,

PhlUC "

—

on the other
61 hand
h.nH

nUrtUri

-'

'

a
are
fundamentally "bio-

-ith nature and the
earth

gainst the necrophUic
male worH

_

^^
^^

^ ^^^^

goals of expressivism,
woraen strive for
uniQn
and one another; women
do not divide
themselves , body
from spirit; women,
en, like
lik* other animals,
wish only to live
free and in harmony.
T
iney
hev are,
rP
y.
however, capable of
degeneration from their
natural
muurai sfatP
state of virtue.
if this
were not the case,
p^qo all
-,n women
would recognize and act
on
their sisterhood. Just
Just- ao
as the psychiatrists
needed to
explain how the aberration
of homosexuality is
possible
in a being 'naturally'
heterosexual, lesbian feminists
find themselves called upon
to explain this misalliance
and collaboration. Much
lesbian-feminist scholarship is
devoted to examples and explanations
of the ways in which
women are perverted by men, made
to see men's battles and
ri

^

•
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idSntified '' defl

—

thSmSelVeSandtheirt

»

^Man-feminist

-—

in terms

aUen

tQ

Male-identi fication

.

false consciousnesS(
aiienation

oneself,

The reclamation of
one'
one

'*y™ gs
ti0n

.

if you

^

wlu

rej6Cti0n

,

q
s

f om
female
energy,
i

requires &
°f

^

in one's internal
and

by contemporary
theorists

,

^^

0f

_

-rophili c elements

^
^

phllosophers

society of the fundamental
role of
ture of our worlds is
mat = h e d in lesbian-feminism,
and
this recognition has
made the construction
of
discourses and l an gu ag es
centr a l to the project
of
building a home. Mary
Daly's two most recent
boo.s,

^

Syn/lcoloay snd

Purest,

^

engage deliberately and

p a infull y in a process of
re-definino
uenning and
,„ rf re-naming
the
world around her:
"Since the language and
style of

patriarchal scholarship cannot
contain or convey the
gynergy...i invent, dis-cover,
re-member words "23 she
.

shares in this with many other
lesbian-feminist scholars
and poets; this project is
seen as crucial.
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The New Lesbian

central word in all
this is<

term

'

leSMan '-

^

the

^

™cation

surprisingiy;
ot

The Woman _
Identified Woman" and
the creation of a
d -LesiDian
lesbian vanguard
the guestion of who
ot what a lesbian
is has been
present.
The questlon is not
merely &
theoretical clarity.
In
..

^^ ^
^

raost of

bx««

is clearly understood,
whatever stereotypes
and

valuations are attached
to it.

a lesbian, to most

English-speakers, is a woman
who engages in sex
with
women; a homosexual
woman.
It is on the basis
Qf
definition that male
gay-rights activists proclaim
common
cause with lesbians; the
definition locates the
problematic difference in the
choice of sexual partner.
This definition, however,
does not serve the needs
of the newly-conscious
group of women

^

who do not see any

common cause with male
homosexuals and who face isolation
from other women.
Lesbian-feminists cannot settle for
equal rights in a male-identified
world; their project is
to build a woman-identified,
woman-loving world, and to
do this they must deal anew
with the perennial issues of

social theory.

Engaging in

a

radical process of

"cultural reconstruction",
'

lesbian -femmists
lesblan
f.
•

from the ground up.

must start

This process of
reconstruction has as
stated
Sarlier threS
aluation of lesbianismi
explanation o f the status
of
,

'

'•

-

^

world,

^

and historical
iocation of a community.
Recent
-search info women's history
supports this by providing
a sense that, in
fact, this 'community
of women' has
always existed, but
has been overlooked
by
historians.
The project of 'herstory'
i s t0 reveal
that
community so that conte m
porary lesbians will not
be
alienated and isolated,
suffering fro m the constant
need
to begin communities and
originate identities. By
discovering earlier 'resistance'
to heterosexual
imperatives, lesbians can
provide themselves with
both
analysis and history, a
'cultural etiology' of sorts,
a

positive ground for self-understanding
and meaning.
sense of aloneness, of negativity

The

that is so central to

being significantly different
in society is relieved by
replacing the society with one which

affords positivity.

Within the new community, everyone
is

a

lesbian;

however, that does not make lesbianism
irrelevant.

keeping with the nature of reversal,
lesbianism is

In
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essential

a lesbian identity
13 now t-h
Y is
the Price of admisS1 ° n
community', the proof
of trustworthiness.
Sexuaiity rem ains the
final

^

,

^

test of one's

loyalty to civilization.

^

There are two problem,
with thls
The first
of exclusion.
the claim
lesbianism
Privileged is to be credible,
theorists have to deal
with
the embarrassing evidence
of non-feminist or
antifeminist lesbians, with
those lesbians who live
in
butch/femme roles and
relationships, and with
those who
like men.
The valorization of
lesbianism seems inevitably to lend support to
these women's choices, but
they
are completely unacceptable
to the new lesbian feminist.
The other problem is that
of inclusion.
Particularly
when looking to the past,
one can never be sure about
the

„

^

^

.

^

nature of the relation between
any two women. Many women
whom contemporary lesbians would
like to claim as
ancestors and models present either
ambiguous evidence of
sexual activity with other women,
or no evidence at all;
and yet their inclusion seems essential.

How can these

problems be resolved?
The answer has been to redefine the word
'lesbian'
so as to include those women that
seem to provide posi-

.

tive models while
excluding

menon that inif^n,,
tial ly
it beco.es

dear

miSlSading t0 SU

te

^

MZa " e

what is at stake

^

^

St

alone.. lt concerns

^

.

^^

^

on

.

ft

Aph ^_

waning when

^

issue is one o f
defini-

^

^

ives and
the kind of social
and political
political interpretation
i„ t
that we
as women brino
ng to
tn our
f,„r
lesbian existence "24
It also
concerns the demarcation
cation of
nf t-h=
the community, both
historically and in the
present.
1

.

What, then,

is a lesbian?

There have been several

prominent definitions,
all shades of
widely cited and popular

a

new color.

A

one is that of Blanche
Wiesen

Cook in her article,

Political Activism:
Goldman". 25

"Female Support Networks
and

^

LiUian Wald, Crystal Eastman,
Emma

In this pieC6/

she

^

"women who love women, who
choose women to nurture and
to
create a living environment
in which to work creatively
and independently". She
explains that "lesbians cannot
be defined simply as women
who practice certain physical
rites together... physical love
between women is one
expression of a whole range of
emotions and responses to
each other that involves all
the mysteries of our human
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nature.

Woman-related women feel
attract-'
attraction,
yearning,
and excitement with
women. "26
"nat is most striking
in this definition
is the
feature that it shares
with most of the new
definitions
This is the derogation
of sexuality or
sexual behavior as
a defining
characteristic of lesbianism,
while retaining
a focus on „ ome n,
the new definitions
unani m ousl y reject
the 'clinical' concept
as itself sufficient,
what is
central to lesbianism now
is, not the act
but the
emotion; or, rather, not
the sexual act but
the verbal,
emotive and political acts.
Far from being sufficient
demonstration of one's
loyalties, lesbian sexuality
may
now in fact confuse the
issue; Adrienne Rich
argues that
sexual lesbians who have
otherwise bonded with men
have
subverted the cause of women. 27
while
she sees a

"nascent feminist political
content in the act of
choosing a woman lover or life
partner"28, this contenfc
can only be "realized" through
conscious women-

identification

-

the adoption of lesbian-feminism.

The Radicalesbian description
of the lesbian in

terms of rejection of social roles
rather than those of

desire found fertile ground among
feminist lesbians,
whose prior experience of persecution
for sexual choices

qUite W

—
™—
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to downplay or
ignore fchis

understanding; "Lesbian
cultural
tUral rfem "rstsinsistence
leSbianiSm iS
t
"« d i=al female
friend _
SUP " rathSr tha
"
ce reflects an un•

- «« -

witness

t0

««t

that within the iar
g er culture

lesbianism is viewed as
a "perversion
sion.
a simple explanation
of

29..

Hn
However,

such

the
ne shift rio
does not do justice
to
the full complexity
of the i£sue
Def nition s a
process of location
r>*
cation, of
the investiture of
meaning, and
this meaning goes
beyond its motivation
as well as
extending past the words
themselves.
speaking of the
truth of propositions,
Hans-Georg Gadamer stresses
that
it is a matter neither
of "factual correctness
and
congruence, nor solely of
"the content in which
it
stands", but rather rests
on "its enrootedness
and bond
with the person of the
speaker in whom it wins its
truth
potential"; that truth "can
be disclosed only if one
traces its history of motivation
and looks ahead to its
.

_

,

m

implications". 30

The same may be said of
definitions;

they are 'true' to the extent
that they resonate in us
and make sense of the world,
and this is a matter both of
motivation and of (perhaps unseen)
implication.
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What, then,

does the 'non-.i
non-clinical' definition
of
lesbianism disclose?
what 15
is ltS
it-, b0nd
k
t0 those who
adopt
it?
i

—
—

In their rejection
of a definif
definition based on
sexual

ehavior

'

the critique of
genital<

dSVelOPed

^

Brown.31

This critique

SSXUaUty

" lth Capitalis

,

have drawn on and
expanded

goal . directed(

^^^^^

dians after World
War

-

- cane.

„

and

^

for the return of

the 'polymorphous
perversity , characteristic
of infantue
sexuality.
The assault Qn
genitai

^

combined with the critique
of instrumental reason
developed in the Frankfurt
School and framed

the calls for

cultural revolution
characterist
j-a^Lerisric
r nf
of #>,
the post-1950s
West
i

In feminist circles,
this analysis took the form
of

an opposition between
male and female natures,
masculine
and feminine values and
modes of relation. Men are
instrumental, competitive,
compulsively aggressive, and
slaves to a goal (orgasm) -oriented
sexuality; women are

nurturant, cooperative, beyond
linear/logical thinking.
This is reflected in their
sexuality; as Alice Echols

—

«
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it,

s

wlthin radical
femlnism

„

women/s

-sumed

to be more sp iritu
al than sexual>
and
considerably less cenfcral
tQ thgir uves

^

sexuality to men's.

deserts

For instance,

M rienne

Rich
female sexuality as
an 'energy which
ls

the body itself
tself.

'

"32

T
In
contrast/

„

male sexuaUty

driven,

^

irresponsible,
e, crenll-an,,
genitally oriented, and
potentially lethal ...•Men
Men crave
rrs 1m power
and orgasm, while
women seek
reciprocity and intimacy. "33

^

It is simple enough
to see in this the
return of

pre-feminist dichotomies
between men and women,
and this
is indeed dangerous;
however,
that is not the central

point here.

Our concern, tamer,
rather
-

1, t
„ .see,
ls
to

not simply

how the redefinition of
lesbianism depends on and
reinforces distinctions between

the sexes, but to examine

its implications for 'the
living of lesbian lives'.

motivation for redefinition

-

The

the establishment of

positive identity, community,
and history

-

can be

evaluated only after the discernment
of its consequences
for the actual self-understandings
of
lesbians.

Christopher Lasch has argued that
the social and
conceptual oppositions of masculine/feminine,
instru-
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-tal/holistic, and
isolated/related are

—

s

of the

in fact two

^

„

legacy of primary
narcissismll( which
seeks
to deny the fact
of dependence on
a world beyond
He asserts that
both sides

MtUmi °" "
for

s y mbiosis

f

~

^.^

—

°f

n,

no less so than
the

the

feminine „ lQnging

..

soliMc

..^^

^^^

drive for absolute
master y ...3 4 Seen .„
choices rai! t0 0 pen
up the room for us
to develop as
UniqU6 C ° nfliCt - ridto
'
individual. tr ying to
live with
others, an d so leave
us in continual
danger of threats to
our selfhood, our
personhood, b y those who
approve of us
as well as those who
do not.
That something of this
is latent in the
^definitional process was seen
b y Barbara Gittings
quite
early.
a critique of "The
Woman-Identified Woman",
she argues:

m

^^^^

dS an Unhappy ^"Product
of a
sexist
tural
set " u PShe
°^
is
supposed
to be
l^tf
continually at war with sexism
and male
supremacy, yet guilty for not
meeting society's
10US y' She
gain ,,ma
autonomy"
onTv
e
ldentlf
with other people - the
Z
halL oft human
batch
beings who happen to be female and joining in a collective
search for an
authentic selfhood. .. In sum, the
lesbian needs
a different sense of self
and can't be trusted
to come up with it on her own
without benefit
of group-think. .The contorted
theory of woman-

^

y^

.

*™
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th^K°*^

also claimed
outcome of a fa,,n-„
reconstructing 35^

WhSther

.

i esblar

^
>

P

tic th6 ° rieS th
was a faulty
" eeded

~ «~

"

"

tU, Somewhat polemi
cal Presentation
of the problem,
it does point fco
for the 'lesbian
community'.
In looking at
Psychological issues
presented in tne Los
Ang eles

^

tissues

lesbian-feminist community,
Sherry McCoy and
Maureen
Hicks have noted that
"the sometimes visionary
politics
of feminism have
contributed to our making
unrealistic
demands on each other "36.

ZfTJSToi

£ o—^suTit--"~

l^lTsT
significance.

WomeTwh

tnat
that

r
\ ^sen It^Zl
d

-t

ei
Se
al and
"?e
lesbian" and "dyke"

^

^

valued identities within
and they joined in giving

:

d

;

naftSen ity"

9

un d

tM^^X,
were oosifiJi,,

each other
n9 33 WS V ° Wed homa e
'?
9 to the
beliefs 'a^H
and values
officially espoused by the
community as a whole, we were
able
experience a common magical union. 37to
3

Thus the problem that emerges
is not simply that

women are still being characterized
as loving, nurturing,
virtuous beings, in contrast to
rapacious man; the

.
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™-

fUndamSntal

1-

sublet

—

is

"at,

as leS bi a ns,
they are no

t0 what Heidegger

wouM

J

„

subjecti 2 _
they are at the
hands Qf
psychiatric
tabliShment
«, sub je ctivi z i ng impulse
the refus.l to
let beings; ben<
rathec
-

«

^

—

^

-

^

,.

^

^

h as been accepted
in lesbian . femlnism

lesbren, but the
LesMan

.

fche

p0litically/sexnauy

/=ultu rally correct being,
the carrier of
feminist consciousness.
The eommunity

^

^ ^^^^

^

t-

this valuation is
indeed a home, but it
is not the
of free, adult human
beinos
oeings.
tv^ problem
The
is not the act
of separation, the
moment of separatism;
seoarat- . m
some such space
is clearly necess ary
for many „ omen as
a welcome
antidote to u b i qu i tous male
powe r a nd presence.
The
i

.

,

problem lies in the grounds
an d terms of this
seperetion.
A separatism that is grounded
on the metaphysical
difference between male and f
ema i e essence, and that
ch a racterizes those essences
as radical lesbian-feminists
have done, leaves little or
no room for the development
of diverse, individual
patterns of relationship with the
larger society

The legitimate drive for community

degenerates into unmediated unity,

a

unity that carries
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-

if

twin an excessive
fear of

~. m

.

^

metaphysical

^^^^

^ ^

lesbian . feminism;

is its central
weakness.

Lesbian-fe.inis™ has
developed in response
to
Political and psycho-social
disenfranchise^.
conte xt

In this

,

it was immediately
percelved

co^unity was needed

^

some

to counter this
silence.

What is
only now beco.ing
clear is the cost of
si mp i e unlty
unlisted by individual
differences.
Such unity can
only be achieved
through the imposition
of certain
categories and the denial
or outright rejection
of any
other possibilities.
So me ^position, so
me definition,
is of course
indispensable to our
understanding and
communication; nowever,
however a^ Hi.
discourse that

does not admit
the possibility of
alternative discourses or new
categories that challenge
the old is a discourse
solely
of domination, not that
of politics.
The first necessity
for politics must be the
recognition that others exist
independently of oneself, and that
these others are no
less 'real' or 'valid' for
that.

The painful perception of the
limits of a naive

liberalism which arose in the 1960s
resulted in

a

romant-

ic reaction which focused on
destroying the high walls

SreCted

— - — -^ ^
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t,is reaction has
suffered from the same
deficiencies as
mOVementS
of t h ese deficiencies
are the
collapse of the public
sphere
e and the
y
fh« compensatory
'politicization' or
of ail
all relationships
r*i
u
and values; the
introduction of the notiQn
Qf a pre _ poiiticai
communit ^
a natural unity
that might soraehow
be
,

^^"^

'

*~

regained;

withdrawal from larger
society

poUty

^^

^

reactions to an alienating
world, they oannot
be taken as
sufficient solutions to
the problem of lesbian
or f em ale
identity and status.
Just as the unreflective
appropriation of Rousseau led
to the Terror,

just as the

modern philosophers of the
will have too often been
used
in the service of
anti-liberal and anti-democratic
movements, so too the blanket
rejection of American
liberalism has led lesbian-feminists
into the tyranny of
transparency, the world of black
and white without

shadows or nuance.

That this was not intended is

certain; that it must be corrected
is equally so.
The
search for a home must stop short
of narcissism if

liberty is to exist for whole
human beings,

just as

liberty must stop short of social
disintegration and
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in di v idual

alienation if we

lndlVidUalS
'-

U

^

a

^

t

^

to be seen whether
lesbi an-

feminism can accomplish
this.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SADOMASOCHISM: the challenge
OF DIEEERENCE

A"

great social and
poUtical changes generate
further movement.
Some
6 of
hic development
*
thls
°f r
will be in
the nature of reaction,
attempts to restore
i-esuore a conceptual
and Political status
quo
oust as much activity
result from the extensions
of the new thought
and
discourse, and their
interaction with the
existing world
an ° ther S ° UrCe
h
°f
the reaction of those
within a movement to its
inevitable limitations and
restrictions.
Each of cnese
these rh»n=„„
challenges serves to deepen
our understanding of the
largest dimensions of
the new
thought by revealing its
assumptions, its tendencies,
and
its strategic location
in society,
within the new
discourse, it may be difficult
to ascertain the true
character of any new issue;
reaction may pose as
revolution, fulfillment may be
perceived as a threat,

m

.

~

^

-

according to one's understanding
of the nature and goals
of the movement.
It is at this point that
the individual
finds herself pressed to define
her own understandings of
and aims for her community.
Lesbian-feminist discourse about sex has
arrived at
this place.

At the beginning of the movement,
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issues of
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sexuality were conceived
eo of
or and Hi.
discussed in terms
of
Partner choice. The
need to for m a
positive
understanding of lesbianism
found a home in
feminist
discussions of sex and
gender oppression and
the role of
Personal relations in
maintaining larger social
and
political inequalities.
The insiahtnSlght t-h
that- ™e must

examine
all aspects of our
lives if* Tia
a
we are
to see what Marilyn
Frye has called the
'birdra<T«'
birdcage of oppression,
that
network of 'minor' carriers
barriers fh^
that „composes a system
of
immobilization, was bound to
the lesbian experience
of
silence and fear to produce
a systematic
analysis of the
relations between lesbian
oppression and that of women
as
a whole.
i

This analysis retained
the primary bifurcation
between heterosexual and
lesbian, but it gradually
shifted both the valence and
the meaning of lesbianism.

Lesbianism now had less to do with
sex, and more to do
with emotional commitments.

This shift was the result of

pressures both theoretical and
practical.

The early

hostility and fear toward lesbians
on the part of

heterosexual feminists was disarmed
by the relocation of
lesbianism with the pre-existing
discussion of female

separatism and difference, whereby lesbianism
was
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Present
0rd6r

^

as the

make

tMS

however ' iesMans

atUCtaMt; AUCS
and,

^
~

^
-

—-

to a lesser extent,

^

Qf

^

a suspicious
audience

^

imize sex and emph
; size

«*-

that ,the homophobia,

the anti-sex
sex attHt
„
attitudes
within

certain elements of
the movement precluded
lesbianfeminists from promoting
lesbianism as a sexual
rather
tnan a political choice."!
Lesbianism became 'safe'
by
becoming something other
than what it had been,
a
creature no longer of
physical desire but of
political
desire - the desiree ror
for equal,
eoirsi
non-oppressive personal
relationships
Standards for acceptable
sexual behavior have been
derived from the conceptions
of woman held by the
primary
theorists of lesbian-feminism.
The portrayal describes
women as passionate, yet
not genitally-focussed;
passion
for women is more a general
life force than particular
sexual desire. Women's
sexuality,
in this view,

diffuse, tender, committed,
and reciprocal.

is

As relations

between women, then, and
particularly woman-loving women,
lesbian sexuality is sharply
contrasted to both heterosexual and homosexual male sexuality.
Mary Daly's
contrast between "biophilic" sisterhood
and "necrophilic"
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"

male m ° n0gender ms

—

^"

PaSSi ° n aims at

Self and other, male
desire

to sexuality;
while

-

celebration of

squires
t
conquest and

annihilation for its
satisfaction.
Th e conse qu ences
of this thought
became apparent by
mid- 1970s and the
tension has escalate.
steadily
,

intimacy be egalitarian
and 'correct'
correct „»=
*
was denial
and
repression.
Unsure of their desires
and their

Plications, lesbian-feminists
generally deemphasi ze d
the importance of sex
in women's lives,
while this
strategy fit comfortably
with the need for
acceptance and
a sense of historical
continuity with non-sexual
womanbonded women, it imposed
a great stress
on individual
lesbians at the most personal,
most complex, and least
understood point in their
tneir lives.
u„«,
In reaction, many women
chose to not have sexual
relations at all.
others
worried, as did heterosexual
feminists, about the meaning
of their desires and
fantasies. A movement that
began by
addressing the problems of a
minority defined by
sexuality was rapidly approaching
the point where
community acceptance required
as much repression and
concealment of one's sexuality as
before.

In 1976,

the first sounds
of reoeiiion
rebellion were heard
In an article
entitled "Cathexis"
X1S
k
Barbara
^th announced
that she was a leshian-f Q m'
lesbian-femmist who was
also a
Sad0maS ° ChiSt
thSr
°
he, lead, and by
1980 Sad
-s a serious and dlvisive
issue
within the lesbian-feminist
'

~

~
-

•

communifcy

SVery neWSP3Per

eV
'

"y

been the site of furious
ar

„

Every side accuses
the other

_

^

lesbian-feminist group has

<s,

t and

of bad faith,

of

dogmatism, of self-serving
motives, and of destruction
of
the women's movement.

Pleasure and Power: The
Dilemma of Sexuality

The basic question of the
debate has been, is
lesbian sadomasochism consistent
with feminism? Such a
question is intriguing partly
because
it is so

unexpected. Sadomasochism is
a practice that has found
few public defenders.
It is, as Gerald and Caroline
Green describe it, "the last
taboo"2.
Its eme rgence as
topic for debate, and especially
as a topic capable of

splintering the lesbian community,
suggests that something radical has happened, not only

to our ideas about

a
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is not the
question itself

interesting), but
rather/

ifho
u
(though
certainly that is

L-uex or its
emergence
Why should
sadomasochism be an
issue
bue for
ror feminism?
why
tMs an issue for lesbian-f
eminists
what

fw

^

«

tendencies of lesbian-feminist
theor y? These are
faSCi tin
deep ly troublesome
questions
must be grappled with.

-

^

—

^

It is not at all
surprising that the anti-

pornography women, and
many others, have
not seen
connection between feminism
nism ,nH
and sadomasochism.

a

"Given

prevailing ideas of
appropriate feminist sexual
behavior
S/M appears to be the
mirror opposite.
It is

dark and
polarized, extreme and
ritualized, and above all,
it
celebrates difference and
P ower."3 The image Qf
sexuality developed by
lesbian-feminists leaves no room
for such a desire; to even
conceive of finding pleasure
in such a mode is to
betray one's female

^

soul,

victim to male thinking and
desire,

^

m

to fall

order for the

^

question of feminism to be
ue assort
asKed at all, then, something
must have given way.

T

*

° Unde

~

the polarization
that has

,s necessary t0
examine

diSC ° UrSe

*

°"

^

^

late

l

^^^^^

970 S and 1980
<

.

s

That dlSC ° UrSe 1S
thS °« e bounding
pornography
focus on male
predation and violence
9r ° Und UP ° n

-Id

meet

.

WMCh

A

and lesbian feminists

It allows

lesMans tQ

xn language that
finds acceptance

heterosexuaUty

amMg heterosexuai

feminists, making a
secure place fQr
lesbianism
exposing the danger of
men.
By clai m ing the
shared
status of victims of
male rage and lust/
women can
overlook or deny the
differences among themselves
that
h a ve been so painful.

^

However,

consequences.

such

a

strategy has problematic

Carol Vance asks: "if
wome n organize

around their oppression b
y and through differentiation
from men, should they not
maintain a united front,
stressing their shared and
unifying characteristic,
femaleness?"4 The "fear of
difference among women" that
She perceives, and the inability
to work through or with
that fear, result all too often
in the theoretical denial
of relevant difference.

The anti-pornography movement

has derived its energy in part
from its ability to
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command the loyalties
=r,w
pities and
perspectives of many
diverse

^e

first cost is that
of overemphasizing
sexual
danger.
Vance notes that,
that
r=
«
far
from liberating
women to
be themselves, the
anti-pornography movement
..restates
the main premises
of the old gender
system: the dominant
cultural ideology
elaborates the threat
of sexual danger,
so the anti-pornography
movement responds by
pushing for
sexual safety via the
control of public
expression of
-le sexuality.
the focus continues
.

^

.

sexual pleasure for women
wumen is still
.hh minimized and the
exploration of women's DleasursHi * «
Pleasurable experience remains
slight. -5
In keeping with thig/
the
Qf

^

.

anti-pornography movement have
repeated the lesbianfeminist rejection of talk

about "sexual liberation",

seeing in it only "the
patriarchal trick- of 'relaxation
of taboos' ".6 women, it
seems, are sexually ensnared
within patriarchy; while the
restrictions of maledominated morality are odious,
even worse is the abandonment
nt of those restrictions in
a quest for pleasure.
Such
-

quest can only lead to destruction,
to male domination,
whether physical or psychic.
a
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The second cost
xac *-v,«
the consequence
of this emphasis
Within an embattled
atmosphere
osphere, th«
these women simply
cannot
afford to appreciate
diversity or any
politics that
a
s it.
Appeals for the
recognition
differences
i

—

among women

^

-

whether they
tney be
oe diffo
differences of class,
race
sexual preference, or
any other - are
translated in this'
context into threats
against a dement,
elements that
would splinter and
destroy the true
crue
fh»
'

m ° St lmP ° rtant Unit

^

Th *

the central, the

"suit has been described

in

Chapter Three; the
inability to differentiate,
to account
for irreducible
multiplicity among women,
leads only
to

political isolation and
individual conformism.
The
threat of community
expulsion and withdrawal
of
validation serves to keep
lesbians in place just
as
surely as does the charge
of pathology.
The feminist discourse of
the 1970' s succeeded in
removing lesbianism from
the realm of the pathological,
but only by recasting it
in less sexual terms and

concurring in other social
judgments about sexual
deviance, within the lesbian

community, however, much

discussion was devoted to the idea
of desire, of passion,
of female sexuality as a source
of strength and joy.
Secure in the knowledge that lesbian
desire was life- and
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~-

afflrraing

,

women were exhorted

bodies and pleasure.

^

^^^^^

^

Confession and Conformity

in this context,

lesbian sadomasochists
began to

talk about what they
did.

The history of
lesbian .

feminis, had endowed
the m with two basic
beliefs that
-de this not only desirable,
but neoessary.
Pirst was
the idea that one's
sexuality
J-L-y is a oolite
political matter, part
of a seamless web of
the expression of
self.
Second was
the reliance on community
evaluation for one's identity
and behavior that has
been so problematic for
contemporary lesbians.
reaction to a hostile society,
lesbian-feminists created a
shelter and a framework for
the development of a self
not at war over its
sexuality.
Gayle Rubin describes the
impact of this early community:
I did not experience
the full force of
homophobia.
On the contrary, to be a
baby dyke
in 1970 was to feel great
moral selfconfidence.
One could luxuriate in the
knowledge that not only was one
not a slimy
Perert, but one's sexuality was
especially
blessed on political grounds. As a
result, I
never quite understood the experience
of being
gay in the face of unrelenting
contempt. 7
,

m
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S6nSe
h
bS9an

"

P-ctice that

"

ab ° Ut

mandate

-

is Known as

f° r

—™

3 P ec ificaily ,
,

y,

lesbians

coraing out ,

they adQpted
.

reveaung

a

^

sexual preference to
those around one in
order fcQ
the silence an d
presumptions that reinforce
Coming out makes the
possibility and actuality
of
difference more visible,
with the ai m of
enhancing both
the awareness of others
and the self-esteem
of the one
coming out.
"The open avowal of
one's sexual identity
explains John D" Era ilio,
"whether
at

home,

^

^

^

or before television
cameras, symbolized the
shedding of the self-hatred
that gay raen and women

internalized, and consequently
it promised an immediate
improvement in one's life.
To come out of

^

quintessentially expressed the
fusion of the personal and
the political that the
radicalism
of the late 1960<s

exalted. "8

Marie France states that "Coming
out is predicated
on three assumptions: that
sexual practice has to do with

personal identity, that the two are
one and the same, and
that voicing one's identity is the
best way of 'knowing'
it".

9

These assumptions lie at the heart
of both gay
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liberation and
lesbian-feminism.

They are

understandable; as noted
in Chapter
r Two
p
iwo
th. sense that
the
sexual practice reflects
reriects, indeed
^
manifests, one's
essential identity not
onl y Ues at the
heart of modern
Psychiatr, hut is basic
t0 our contefflporary
thinking about sex and
sexual difference.
Tne third assumption
also has a long past
in Western
societies. „ ichel
Foucault has
'

^^

confession is

^^

a rpnt-r^i
central „i
element

in Western lif e:

The confession has
spread its pf
fo
„
effects
far
wide.
and
it nbvq »
t
•

-e

„

r^-

SffiS' n-t¥ --"°-hi P a ;"n alrS
of
everyday life and'Tf n^""*
rit6S;
one confesses' one's cr
"e^on f^"
thoughts and desires™^
InrlstlTL?*'*

troubles; one goes about
telling with tL
greatest precision, whatever
is^foif f

icult

in making this point,
Foucault is concerned to
show us

that the techniques and
aims which we see as
central to
freedom serve instead to
constrain us through their
elicitation and publication of
our most private selves.
The confession plays a
central role in this constraint;

originally treated as an obligation,
it has become a
necessity, the necessity of
revelation.
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^
^
™

f

8
the cohtr. ry? it
8
°"
truth, lodged
in our most secret
nat,,^ ''f„d
S
surface; that if it
t0
this
cause a constraint h
bei °i n °f°'
P lac e, the
violence
Ce of
f *
r
h8
d
finai ly be° arti
C
a t :r? n Y
t
t
y
the price ° f
kind of liberation. 11
*

Se^o^tS"

'

™
^
T

^ T'

^"

»

Central to this necessity
is the belief that
the intent
of power is negative;
that is, we are hound
to the idea
that power demands that
we be siient,
silent
t-w
that we repress the
truth and constrain
ourselves
VSS/ and
3n H
conversely, that our
r>

'

liberation requires defiance
of this command.
These
beliefs form the base, not
only of Christian
confession,
but of psychoanalysis and
other psychologies, and
of most
modern social and political
theory.

They lie at the base

of feminism; the descriptive
phrase 'the personal is
political' quickly became
prescriptive, enjoining

constant, minute analysis of
our lives.

"if what we are

talking about is feminism then
the personal is political
and we can subject everything
in our lives to scrutiny.

•

•

If we are to scrutinize our human
relationships, we

must be willing to scrutinize all
aspects of those
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relationships.

The subject of
revolt
revolution
is ourselves".
•

12

This scrutiny ia
prec isel y what
lesbian

Sad0maS0ChiStS

6dlted

^

«*

PUbUShed

*

—

-

-

a

boo,

a

iesbian-te.inist s/m
'support group', Katherine
Davis writes that
We must reexamine
our politic ° f
SSX and
Power.
The challenge
talklng
Personally
explicitly about allthf
and
and about "how our
sexualitv^dlffers
much destructive as
not so
it if I
corrective, and
necessary
^
w!
much Is
-o
we^ifwitf
6 must
have precisely the same h7=i
texture of our sexuatTt, dlalogues ab °"t the
about class^m, racism
cultural
Physical appearand Ink
abUityt
'

^

^

'

^

-

'

Why must we have these
dialogues,

'

^

^^
^tf^'
"

Davis explains that

anti-s/M attitudes are
embedded in many areas

examrnatxon of our experience
is a femin st
Th ° Se ° f US wh0 have
been
work,^' actively
\ in the movement
working
for
many years
are being labelled
anti-feminist, mentally^"
or worse.
Lines are being drawn and we
find
ourselves, guite unexpectedly,
on the 'otherside.
We are being cast out, denied.
We
become heretics 14

.V

.

What must be explored further
is the premise,

implicit in her argument, that the
answer to attitudes of

disapproval is to talk,
talk t-o
to «
expose oneself
precisely at
that point of censure.
censurp
th^o premise
This
is based on the
belief that the
disagreement is a matter
i„
of ignorance
and
fear that must be,
can only
be
rnnnf. A with
±Y oe,
countered
the truth
Absent is the idea that
some areas
eas ot
of llfe
lif. may be subject
to inherent, intractable
disagreement.
The tenor of
Davis- remarks, and
or most s/m wrltings
,

^

any disapproval, any
hesitation is illegitimate
and
oppressive.
The celebration of
individual choice, such
an important part of
lpqhi^n struggle,
P
lesbian
here becomes a
demand for inclusion
nciusion in the community
on the individual's
terms

m

Community Definition and the
Meaning of Feminism

To understand what is at
stake in the s/m debate, we

must remember the motivations
behind lesbian-feminist
theory. One of the central
functions of and aims for

lesbian-feminism has been the
establishment of a new
community, a new lecus for the
production of meaning and
identity in the lives of lesbians.
In perceiving this
need,

lesbian-feminist theorists initially rebelled

against the individualism that would
force each person to

.
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^

h6rSelf

"

the harrenness of

iS
.

°—
civilization

what P hil ip Rieff
has labeUed

—

response to

„

_
^^

negative c

it

^

leshian-feminists have
soughfc
thr ° U9h
C
"ion of "positive
communities", those
able to cure trough
the achieves hy
the individual
of his collective
identity". 15

^

in distinguishing
positive f rom negative

communities, Rieff explains
that

to survive almost
automatically b
's
sustarnxng technology, do
not ^ f r a type of
collective salvation, and in
which the
r
1C
erienCe
n0t transformative
but rather
out
rathe inf ormat ive 1}f6

%

-T

Rieff goes on to note that,
while "advanced industrial
communities are no longer culturally
positive", moderns
have not given up on the
foundation of new positive
communities.
This can be seen in the rejection
by Adler
and Jung of the austere vision
of Freud;
it is also

prominent in Marxism.

Running through modernity, as

a

counterpoint to the development of
science and analytic
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modes of understanding
reality
Aity, is the
h(a
constant thread of
quest for a semblance
of integration
in a
disintegrating world.
t-

This same quest is
evident in lesbian-feminism
it Presents a
powerful anaiysis Qf

*****
WMe "

^

general and

^ians

^

in particular,
the

strongest appeal of
lesbian-reminist thought
lies in its
P-ise of a new Jer usale m beyond
the diaspora of
sexual
slavery.
For contemporary
lesbians, feminism is
the
language of explanation,
legiti ra ation, and,
ultin.a-.ely,

redemption.

Because gay liberation
does not effectively
analyze the status of
women, even those women
who
identify primarily with the
gay movements recognize
a
debt to feminism.
The
*
6 nnw^rof fem
P ° Wer «^
mism for lesbians has
lain in its ability to
link an analysis of gender
oppression to critiques of the
social construction of
sexuality so as to provide a
new set of understandings
and meanings for lesbians.

When lesbian sadomasochists
set out to discuss and
legitimate their sex, then, feminism
was the language of
choice.
As Amy Hoffman explains, "Lesbians
who enjoy S/M
sex have spoken about their desires
and fantasies in
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feminist terms because
historical^
Lorically f»
feminism has given
«omen a way tc analyze
sex and
.17
power..

However, the opponents
of sadomasochism
have denied
COnneCti °agreeing that feminism
has ,

extinctive perspective
on

se x and power,

they argue that
that perspective is
inimical to any
practice that
celebrates, magnifies
ues, or is« Kbased
a
*
y
upon power
differentials: "Whatever
er the cause,
p a „«
the acting out of
sadomasochistic desires
163 13 ,
\

^ cont "ry to feminism,
just
role playing
m <n outside the bedroom
«.

dominant/submissivee

as

fltf

is

contrary to feminism. "18
When two seemingly
contradictory positions
such as
these claim the same
authority, it bec0 mes
clear that the
confusion is not simply over
the issue that is being
discussed, but rather is
concerned with the basic
terms
of the argument.
What
i<? at
ar stake
ch =
ai 1S

u

evaluation of

a

•

is,

not simply the

Qnr-+- of
particular sort
sexual activity, but

the meaning of 'feminism'
itself.
This has been the nature of
'feminism' since its
inception.
In its adoption by adherents
of different

theories and commitments, it has
meant slightly different
things to each person.
This confusion is due to the

'essentially contested' nature of
feminism's central
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values.

—

as a theory of
women's oppression,
oppression

,
feminism

has

ys pointed toward
some non _ oppressive
possibiiity

^

ar9USd

that "contemporary

-terest

of

that

^

f erainists

«**!..

is inevitable
,

necessarily

_

in

^^^

their predecessors
in freedom,

equality,.19

Because these values
are central to
feminism, feminists
cannot avoid
une controve
^ the
controversies and
struggles that have always
surrounded
•

them.
The issue of sadomasochism
has become a central
forum for debate over
these
ese va]„«
values within the lesbianfeminist community.
Bat-Ami Bar On explains:
e

r Ct
Sadoma ChlSm haS SUrfac
an iss
ssue
ue tor
f
for £L
the women's
f
community becau^ it-'
fragmented
lessons about
sexual1 repression and
sexual abuse into
SaCh ° ther
struggle for sexual liberation the feminist
has become
polarrzed with the struggle
to end sexual
violence and domination. Each
debating party
0
0
an ° ther feminist lesson
as
thouah ?/ nC ° mPaSSed aU the
to feminist
knowLdge20

^"

^ist

,

SoS r

-

•

•

•

n

"

What are these lessons?

" "

They revolve around notions

of freedom and the status
of consciousness.

While many
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f6miniStS

" 0Uld

^

™-r.a

women to self-determination"21
determinatl ° n iS

—

f

Reimol dt that

_

thg
tne nature of self-

struggle for sexual

^

and lesbian feminism,
led many women
sexuality as the bedrocx
of oppression and
tree.om.
Within this struggle,
the central
tne
central value was
choice - the
real ability to choose
the uses of one's
bo d y, for

^

3

Uberal

^

view of persons an d
society

as describe, in Chapter
One.

Adhe rents of this view
have

translated self-determination
into the ability to
do
"'right as us lest' << just
as we please',."
The „ slmple
command of the Goddess" that
they see as the heart
of
feminism is, »'So that you
harm no one, do what you
will.' "22 Such women
pos t a connect on
.

.

befcween t

^

oppression of gays and lesbians
and that of unsatisfied
or abused heterosexual
women on
the basis of the

repression of d esir e in service
to patriarchal, sexist
imperatives.
In opposition to these
d eman d s,

"insisted on the importance of
subjectivity

-

they have

how it

feels to be oppressed, the truth
about women's individual
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UVM
'

° ur feelin9S
'

pleasures "23

th

« «»
s<

s , pains and

.

Centring

in this understanding
Qf

sadomasochists have argued
for the primacy of
subjectivity with i n
feminism
Thgy
.

^^
^^
^

they should not be
inciuded within the
feminist
community, with their
understanding Qf

practices as definitive;
contemporary iesbians and
gays
do not accede to
heterosexual

demands that they renounce

°r hide their sexuality,
but rather have advanced
new
interpretations of that sexuality
as superior to that of
the psychiatric, legal,
and religious authorities
who had
dominated the debate. The
central claim of feminism,
they argue, has been the
superiority of the individual

woman's understanding and
interpretation of her
experience and desire. To
repudiate this by condemning

sadomasochism and denying its
practitioners full
membership within the lesbian-feminist
community is to
repeat the oppression of gays
that is validated by
medicine and religion.
This simple view of sexual choice
has come under

scrutiny as women began to focus,
not on the need for
pleasure, but on the reality of danger,
and the need to

~
fin

lt
'

.

—-—

Theorists such

Kathleen

^

susan firownmUier<

^

^

oworkin elaborated
on
the network of fear
and domination
sexual lives and th»,
in a society
which sees women
as well as p r i vate

.

Ihis trend

^

lesbian _ feminism

focussed, not on pleasure
h„f on
„
P easure, but
power, arguing that
"true sexual freedom
win be possible Qnly
the connection between
sex an d power, when
there is no
Power component in sexual
interactions. -24 By
power ,,
they mean not only force
u ^e, out
but- all
a n «-u
y
the mechanisms of
control and domination
that lead women to
narrow their
choices, to see as
desirable that which is
against their
interests, to substitute
the imperatives of men
for their
own desires.
Sadomasochism, with its
polarization of
roles and its celebration
of inequality,
appears to be
the epitome of the sex/power
relation, and thus

^^^
,

complicitous in the continuance
of women's oppression.
In response to this,
sadomasochists have argued
along two lines.
The first suggests that power
is what
we make of it; that is, that
one cannot infer from the
express words and actions of the
participants what the
meaning and valence of the exchange
may be.
Thus, a
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=on Sensual s/ m

bating

encm

or actual degradation,

^
and

^

^

Qf
two situations ls
actuaUy contradictor
^
argUmSnt hOWSVer
i. the suggestion
t^t power is an inevitable
component
and thus that
acknowledgment and proper
use Qf
&
more vi a ble, more
'feminist'
=,*
.
feminist strategy
than the denial of
an power relations. The
earlier lesbian-feminist
vision
of female purity has
given way to an
acceptanoe of the
conflicts and imperfections
even among woman-identif
ie d
women'

«-

'

'

—

—^

^

^

^^

^

•

.

This difference in
theoretical understanding

is

outstanding in the writings
of the two camps in the
sadomasochism battle. The
shared meanings of words
such
as oppression, alienation,
and freedom within early

lesbian-feminism have broken down
as the two concerns of
sexual pleasure and sexual
danger have diverged. The
language of pleasure is necessarily
based on the
perceptions and feelings of the
individual; the

enunciation of danger has been
forced to transcend, often
to contradict, those perceptions
and
feelings.

Still

agreed on the basic premise that
lesbian oppression is
the result of the oppression of
women,

and thus that
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si^.cant
9endSr
'

analysis must revoive
tW °

^«

^

adumbrating notions
of

^

oppression an d freedom
that directly oppose
These notions in turn
r«t on contradictory
rest
conceptions
of the self and its
constitution that reflect
the
disputing intultions
of modern teerieans

_

^

in rejecting the
analysis of the
sadomasochists

their opponents had
to chailenge first
of ail the
sovereignty of subjectivity
While one s thoughts
feelings were essential,
they argued, a social
theory
-st be able to go beyond, to
explain and critigue
those
thoughts and feelings.
Their criticise of
the si mp i e
focus on subjectivity
have been those made by
Brian Pay
of simple interpretive
social science.
.

^

,

In

^^ii^i-^otice-

Sggi^^

he argues that the
necessary

reference to individual
meanings and understandings
cannot be a sufficient
basis for unraveling social
systems, (cite)
are four: first,

His objections to simple
interpretation
as he says,

"such a social science

leaves no room for an examination
of the conditions which
give rise to the actions, rules
and beliefs which it
seeks to explicate, and, more
particularly, it does not
provide a means whereby one can study
the relationships

b6tWeen

—

"-"^
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° f a social
order and the

Possible forms of
behaviour and beiiefs
which s
elements engender "25
SeconH such
e
u
Second,
an interpretation
cannot account for,
or even discuss
bCUSS
»t-h«
*
the pattern
of
unintended consequences
of actions-26,

^

.

'

since it cannot
refer bey ond the
intentions and expectations
of the
agents. A third
problem with this model
is that it
"Provides no way for the
social scientist to
understand
structural conflict within
a society, that
is, it offers
no .ethod of analysing
the contradictions
which might
exist between certain
actions, rules, and
co-on
meanings, or between
these and their causes
or
results. "27 flnd finally
Qne must gQ
/

,

^

understandings of the participants
if one is to explain
historical change. All of
these elements are necessary
if we are to truly have a
theory; and, without a theory,
we find ourselves mere
curators of the past and
present,

antiquarians of ourselves.

A central element in the

anti-sadomasochism arguments has been
the insistence on
going beyond the self-understandings
of the participants
in a sexual encounter in order
to grasp the 'constitutive

meanings' that construct the encounter
and infuse it with
O
O
value .28
-i
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in stressing
subjectivity,

sadomasochists are

responding to the
imposition of identity
identitv and history
upon
lesbians that has been
effected by psychoanaiysis,
by
-ligious dog ma and by
phiiosophers, as well
as by the
state.
This imposition has
been cQntinued
,

^^

t

^

service of feminism by
the construction
of standards of
membership and explanations
of lesoian
lesbian „<
,
existence
and
identity within tne
the lesbian-feminist
lchian r~
community, as seen
in Chapter Three.
Further, the insistence
on public
discussion of issues
earlier considered private
mandated
that sadomasochists
talk about what they
did.
•

As

sadomasochists found themselves
outside of the boundaries
of their new community,
they fell back on what
seemed
certain and real - their
bodies, their pleasures and
desires, and their honest
thoughts.
In justifying these
pleasures and desires to a

hostile audience, lesbian
sadomasochists have relied
centrally on the fact that their
sexual relations are
consensual, that they are not
instances of violence and
abuse because they are freely
chosen and because it is

understood that the masochist always
has the option to
stop and to define what may be
done.

It is also argued

as a result of this that what
is going on may be best
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understood in terms of
pi av of imagination
Piay,
and fantasy
rather than 'reality'.
i

y

No onp
one, they argue,
has a right

to limit another's
consensual sex,

-hority

and no one has the

to portray their
activity as violence
or a.use
because they faU to
understand the drama
involved.

Alienation and Authenticity

^e

rejection of these arguments
has been the basis
of extensive writing
about the limitations
of liberalism.
The leading opponents
of sadomasochism are
primarily
academics, either teachers
of philosophy and women's
studies or graduate students,
and their education has
included the history of
political thought. They are
uniformly contemptuous of
consent arguments made within
a
'patriarchal' society, denying
that such a society
affords the possibility for
meaningful choice. Jan
Raymond argues that "consent
to so-called lesbian

sadomasochism can derive its 'meaning'
only from their
status as victimized peers, one
of whom merely role-plays
the part of the powerful"29.
And Robin Ruth Linden
suggests that "the psychological
reality of 'consensual'

sadomasochism is so abstracted from the
actual social and
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historical conditions
that shan
shapeP hhuman
relationships and
6r0tlC deSirS aS t0
be virtually
meaningless-30.
These women also
reject arguments
about P i ay and
fantasy, on two grounds.
™The6 tlrst
fir^f Point,
presented most
cogently by Susan Leigh
Star is
^ar,
i, that
t-w we are in fact
y
unable to choose ourr
contexts and meanings
as we might
fancy, and that to
imagine that we udn
can is to engage in
'objective idealism' 31.
The
ine second
sec-mH argument,
=
made by
Julia Penelope and cited
by many others, is
that
fantasies per se are
anti-feminist; "the more we
rely on
internal fantasies during
our interactions with
other
wimmin (sic)", sne
she says,
qav?
the less we are relating
to
each other as wimmin." Thiq nr-rVh-i kj
mis prohibition extends even
to
ourselves; "To the extent
that we rely on fantasies
for
eur masturbation, we have
objectified our own sexual
feelings." And Audre Lorde
rejects the appeal to play in
terms consistent with those
used for pornography when she
says that " even in
p !a y to affirm that the exertion of
i.

i

,

«- a

,

power over powerlessness is erotic,
is empowering, is to
set the emotional and social
stage for the continuation
of that relationship, politically,
socially and
economically. "32

Thus,

in a replay of the debates over

pornography, the fantasy argument is
considered defective

both because of lts
attempt
dSSlre

^

°f

nature of fantasy.
y-

^

,

compartmentaiization<

intrinsically

Fantasv
rantasy,

degradlng

^

,

•

itit
ls charged,

is

incompatible with authenticity,
with the integrity
Qf

^

^

conflict within oneself
is not a matter
Qf
able, tragic nature
of lite
or
t-h^ „•
life that
gives rise to politics;
it is, rather, a
sign of sickness, a
wound within the
self to be healed. To
be authentic- to be
a person - is
to maintain a unity
between consciousness

and desire,
reason and will and
appetite; and for such a
one, to
tolerate the diversity
implicit in politics is to
sin.

When he suggests that
"authenticity is implicitly a
polemical concept, fulfilling
its nature by dealing
aggressively with received and
habitual opinion"33,
Lionel Trilling points to
of authentic personhood.

a

recurring problem for ideals

These ideals serve, not so
much

to tell us how to live, as
to condemn the ways that we
do
live without guiding us in
transformation.
To be

authentic is to be real
real?

-

but how are we to know what is

The sadomasochists argue that they
are being real,

they are being true to themselves
rather than repressing
real desires.

In order to respond to this,

their

opponents have had to
portray these desires
as
^authentic, as a slippage
f r 0m personhood
that must he
conquered.
Thus, when Rohin Ruth
Linden
says that

"sadomasochism is fi rm iy
rooted in patriarchal
sexual
ideology, with its
emphasis on the f ragm
entaticn of

pursuit of gratification",
she must conclude that
"the
recent interest by some
women in sadomasochism
is
testimony to the profoundly
alienated and objectified
conceptions of erotic desire"34
with which we arg aU
burdened.
To be a woman and to
do or desire these things
is so clearly contradictory
as to obviate any further
discussion.
fact, further discussion
is impossible,

m

except among those who already
share the premises; the
notion of authenticity is vague
enough to provide no
basis for argument between- the
truly opposed.
It is

particularly unpersuasive to those
being called
inauthentic; the elegant prose of
alienation and

objectification has been paraphrased by
Johanna Reimoldt
as "the argument of the Idiot-Woman",
who "cannot sanely

choose because she has been too warped
and brainwashed by
her society, poor thing, to know what
she's doing.
The
fact that she is so warped is in turn
proved by the fact

that she has chosen
this behavior". 35
in rejecting the

argents

or the sadomasochists,

radical lesbian-feminist
writers have identified
liberalism with the ar
gume nts made, to the
point of
suggesting that sadomasochism »
is not a deviation
from
the philosophical
origins of liberalism
but a
realization of them "36 Th ,._
This is so both because
of
liberalism's tendency to
abst-raot- „».
abstract
choice from the actual
social context, and
because of the utilitarian
liberal's
focus on individual
happiness, which they
identify with
callousness. Not only do
they have the right to
define
sadomasochism as violence, they
have the obligation to
demystify it, to "place
responsibility on the aggressor,
thus allowing women's
experience to be named,
described,
and acted upon"37
.

•

#

Lesbian-feminists who object to
sadomasochism are
now facing the charge of
narrow-minded arrogance, and are
using all the theoretical
equipment of the Hegelian
revolution to counter it. Refusing
to rest with medical
or other judgments that have
traditionally included

lesbianism on the list of pathologies,
these writers have
had to formulate arguments out
of what they perceive as
the ground of feminism.

At every point, however, they

i

a-

faced with the challengg

arguments from the

,

fco

^^

mystificatiQns

,
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^
,

ideologies Qf
those who have considered
them deviant
point
about the unknown
background tQ My desire
use. as effectively
against lesbians in
general as
against sadomasochists
(or uKLerosexuai
heteroses,,,
women, those
other -victims' of
patriarch,)
In using the
,

.

^

^

.

for our iarger good,
the lesbian-feminist
must explain
why lesbianism is not
one of those choices
that must be
renounced.
turn, sadomasochists
must be challenged to
describe more fully how a
libertarian position can deal
with issues of social and
sexual power abuse. An
extreme
position may offer the comfort
of consistency, but in
this case it seems to lead
to the elimination of the

m

possibility of community in the
search for pleasure.
dilemma of a situated, non-alienated

The

freedom is what the

issue of sadomasochism has
brought to the fore, and no
simple response will do it
justice.
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Conclusion

What,

debate,

then,

Is lt

suggested,

,

^ ^^

are we to make of
the sadomasochism
as Kathleen

ploy of tne
the leftleft t-„
to weaken radical
feminism
from within?
i s it,
it
*q t-ho
uas
the lesbian-feminist
a

1

sadomasochists would have
aVe

it-

^

ust another frontier
in

the battle for liberation
fro m ignorance ana
intolerance
another newly f ree d f ie l
d f or dialogue and
understanding?
Or is it, indeed, a
child of lesbian-feminism,
but a
child of its defects
rather than
strengths?
The arguments of the
sadomasochists are,
indeed, largely liberal
material; underneath the talk
of
community, the language of
radical analysis and
redemption, lies the Hobbesian
acceptance of power and
the Lockean focus on contract
as the ground of human
relations.
In their talk of sexual
'exchanges' and
'encounters' bereft of any context,
the sadomasochists

are indeed guilty of, not only
objective idealism, but
denial of the reality of any community
underlying

political structures.

Or perhaps, not a denial,

a

so much

as a failure to understand; one
can easily imagine these

writers to be ignorant both of social
theory and of the

force of affectinnsi
sectional, community
y ties in their own
lives
is
«=
this failure that
makes them
opponents, who identify
such naivete

m

•

^

^

An d yet, this is not
a naive liberalism.

Rather ,
what seems to be
occurring
"ng is a recognition of
the price
Sil" Ple
I*""*""*' unity, and a determination to
maintain a core of autonomy
beyo nd sociai
deconstructs
and reconstruction.
The tot alist impuise
in lesbianfeminism, that which
seeks to explain and
prescribe ever,
aspect of life, is being
answered<
by
counter-explanation, but by a
refusal to explain, to
allow oneself to be
explained.
The high walls of
privacy
being built by the
sadomasochists serve to insulate,
not
merely against the state
or male society, but
against
interpretation.
»I am what I say I am",
they say; not
because they reject the
possibility of a hermeneutic
of
consciousness and sexuality, but
because they distrust
the effect of any such
hermeneutic.

„

"

'

^

The sadomasochists have grown
up within lesbianfeminism, and have participated
in discussion and

activities which have exposed liberalism
to the light,
which have questioned the smooth
surface of consent and
choice, the lines between public and
private.

They know

147

that the surface
and the lines of
our

^ _^

not,

they would not treat
social ostracism as
to poX itical
oppression
BQth sides offer
equipped to provide
superior understandings
of
heterosexuality, of
'patriarchy U1
0 f men and women.
How
then, can the
sadomasochists refuse an
authority beyo nd
Objectivity in the one
privileged area of lesbian
sadomasochism And how can
their opponents bac k
away
from the full implications
of their critigu e?
Are both
sides, perhaps, merely
hiding behind a liberalism
they do
not believe, as Glenn
Tinder has suggested of
students in
the 1960's who retreatPd "t-r, nv,
6ated t0 liberal breastworks
when
confronted with
itn rnnwrw.t-^
conservative opponents who
understood the
significance of their styles"38
?

^^^^^ ^

_

,
'

While the privatized,
often hyper-individualist
arguments of the sadomasochists
are not the product of
feminism as much as a general
legacy of Americans, what
is clear is that lesbian-feminism
does mandate a sort of
self-exposure, as well as the sense
that one's life must
be lived as a whole, either
good or bad, either for

freedom or against.

With this sort of pressure,

sadomasochists have cooperated both in
talking about

a
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^^

about,

and in feeling
'oppressed when others
lr
dlSPlSaSUre
F ° r in
* "„ht community such as
leso ianfeminism has developed
in the past,
disapproval does
indeed amount to
exoommunioation
The
me normals
normalizing aim of
confession wor ks precisely
by calli ng to li
ght that which
has been hidden, and
then chasing it, rooting
it out, and
returning to chec* on it.
in the first years
of lesbianfeminism, that strategy
was effective; hut
the charges of
parochialism that surfaced
from women of color,
from
lower-class women, and from
<pre-feminist" lesbians have
left an opening for others
to reoei
rebel ac^inctagainst the judgment
that follows upon confession.
-

.

^

Any change in the situation
will take time, if it
comes at all.
Behind the debate among
lesbians lurk

always the facts of continued
governmental persecution or
lack of protection of gay men
and women in many areas,
which make unity seem so essential.
Rubin has said that
"the real danger is not that
S/M lesbians will be made

uncomfortable in the women's movement.
is that the right,

The real danger

the religious fanatics,

controlled state will eat us all alive. "39

and the rightit

is this

awareness that makes sadomasochists
clamor for inclusion;

149
it is this that
makes them so dangerous
to feminists who
do not want an
y association

with them

.

whether open

-elusion of sadomasochists
and their demands „

m^

or heip feminism
cannot be foreseen;
what is certain
however, is that simple
rejection and silencing
is no

longer available to
those lesbian-feminists
who want s/ m
to disappear.
Fur ther, attempts to
do so can only be

based on the weakest,
least thoughtful
aspects of
lesbian-feminism.
This prospect should
at least
feminists pause.

give
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CHAPTER FIVE

LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS
OF COMMUNITY

"Before

I

compliment either

a

m*n

u>

rt

°" What they have

substituted for ?hem?»

-John Stuart Mill

What,

finally, are we to make
of lesbian-feminism,
How raight the develops
of lesbian-fe ra inist
theory and
its particular issues
illuminate the problems of
society
and politics? Does
analysis of this development
shed any
light on the fortunes and
misfortunes of liberalism?
What is to be gained by
reading lesbian-feminism as

political theory?
The first lesson we can learn
from lesbian-feminism
is the extent to which
relations of power manifest

themselves in and through language.

positive self-understanding and
community have been conducted as

The struggles for a

sense of historical

a
a

struggle to re-define

and re-describe lesbians and
lesbianism.

This process

has been at least partially
self-conscious.

When gays

and lesbians rejected psychoanalysis
as the relevant

discourse for their identities, they did so not
because
155
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psychoanalysts opposed their
political o
or civil liberty
(though some did
oppose
iti
PP°se it),
but ubecause they
believed
that psychoanalysis
was incapable of
expressing a
conception of their lives
that did
•

w

justice to their

a g ency

and dignity,

whatever Freud's own
opinions may
have been, his discourse
has operated
as one of the

paramount 'individualizing'
forces in 20th century
^erica. T he simple
liberalism of the American
psychoanalysts could be seen
to function, not as
a liberatory
force, but as a blind
behind which power could
move
freely into the bodies
and minds

of a deviant population.

As a discourse of laws
and sovereignty,
liberalism could
not address the dangers
posed by a normalizing
discipline
such as psychoanalysis;
liberal justice has been
too

strongly wedded to juridical
theory to (adequately)
account for the problems of
inclusion and dignity.
it is
this narrowness, and these
problems,
that have n>ade

liberalism so unpalatable to the
taste of many moderns.
The relation of power to
language is not unique to
psychoanalysis, however.
The development of lesbianfeminism is a story of the conscious
use of language as
weapon in struggle. This, then,
is our second theme:
identity formation, inevitably bound
as it is to the

a
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location of community
membership, is
ontology but also of
lesbian

^

i dentity

1SVel

"

—

has appeared

Phll ° S

i

^
^ ^

argument

, raatter

^

^

^

^

^

But tMs phiiosQphy
has arisen from and
must be geared
yearea to th„
the concrete needs
of lesbians.
Arguments and deflnitlons
afe
" ith
t0 ete al
than with a view
toward
their concrete implications
for community membership
and
political strategy. The
formatlon Qf g ,
.

^

.

^

™

identity' was achieved,

first,

through the norm a i izing

influence of psychiatry in
the last century, and
then
through the development of
a gay and lesbian
urban
subculture in the 20th century. 1
The re-formation of
that identity under
lesbian- feminism h as been
ar gued for
in terms of truth.
But in fact the issue has
been power;
or,

rather, the issue has been
truth and power.

The first choice in the new
strategy was the rejection of psychoanalysis; the
second was the decision to
ally with feminists rather
than gay men.
The result of
these two moves, first seen in
"The Woman-Identified

Woman", was the production of a new
truth about lesbians
-

the truth that lesbianism is a matter
of politics, of

rebellion, of love for women in

a

misogynist world.

This

.

.
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^
^
—

truth simultaneously
reflected
lesbians and structured

^

latSr think

"

S
'

C

^^^
^^

fche

^
1

or rigorous,

about what their

difference 'meant'
The guest to get at
the meaning of
Xesbianism
reflects the continuing
i
w lives
temcation of lesbian
y reificatinn
under the sw ay of
lesbian-feminism. After
rejecting
liberalism for lt8
obliviousness fco questiQns

^

identity and power

,

lesblans

^
^ cia ^

some

right to exist.

Under the sway of the
modern belief that
actions are systematic
of being these woraen

^^

,

search for their essenoe
end its meaning.

Because their

oppression h ad been located"
around their choice of women,
it seemed obvious that
this choice was what needed
legitimation
The result, however, was
dismaying,

m

constructing
the new lesbian, lesbian-feminists
did not deal with the
problem of difference. Rather,
they erased it by
valorizing and moralizing lesbian
sex.
The conjunction
of lesbianism and radic a l
feminism resulted in a new

understanding of what lesbianism was
about, what women
were like, and what and who the
problems were. Confident
in their status as victims/survivors/resisters
of
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Patriarchy, lesbian-feminists
brushed aside the selfunderstandings of other
lesbians as male-identif
iedstructured by power rather
than informed by
truth.
At this point, the
issue of lesbian
sadomasochism
came to expose two
problem areas for
lesbian-feminism
first is the problem
of difference,
particularly
sexual difference, and
the second is the
question of
speech.
The confident distinction
between truth/freedom
on the one hand, and
power, on the other,
associating
truth with speech and
power with silence, led
to the
belief that freedom simply
requ ired speaking the
truth
about oneself, thus breaking
the wall of silence and
repression that was seen as
central to lesbian (and
women's) oppression.
This belief was bolstered
by the
reification of the lesbian, which
ensured that any words
spoken, particularly about
sexuality and desire, would be
liberatory and empowering, when
lesbian sadomasochists
began to speak, however, those
lesbians who did not
approve could find no room within
feminism for their
•

inclusion.

Neither could they tell them not to
speak

without becoming the new oppressors.

The totalizing

nature of radical lesbian-feminist thought
guaranteed
that some group would pose such

a

challenge.

And that
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same nature ensured
that the response would
be made in
another normalizing
depth-language, as insidious
as the
one they had fought to
escape.
The political lesson
we
us is not one of doctrine
nor of behavior, but
more
fundamentally of the impulse
to totalization, to

power/knowledge, that is endemic
to modernity.
For it is clear that these
problems - of identity
formation and community
location, of the relations
between language and power,
and of the threat posed
by
modern discourse in all its
varieties - are the problems
facing all contemporary thinkers
in the West.
Lesbianfeminism is often deceptive' on
this point, because a
fundamental belief of most of the
prominent theorists is
that they are doing something new,
something unique,

something totally at odds with 'male'
history and
philosophy.

The belief in an ontological
difference and

opposition between men and women leads them
to ignore or
deny their common involvement with non-feminist
thinkers.
What we are witnessing in lesbian-feminism is

a

new

Enlightenment, another attempt to make words mean what we

want them to mean and to shed the confusion and evil of
the past.

It is crucial,

then, that we heed the lesson
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°f that earlier E nli
ght en m ent, and not
take this one
solely at its word.

The Status of the
Subject

One of the persisting
problem for liberalism
has
been its inability to
relate its ideals of
liberty,
tolerance and dignity to
the real decisions
and policies
of co-o„ life.
The level of abstract
on requ red
maintain a consistent stance
of liberalism renders
one
either isolated from others
in the attempt to
'live one's
principles' or forced to
explain the variety of
exceptions and gualif ications
of the principles that
arise in everyday life with
actual others. Neither Kant
nor the British liberals
ended up with an actual defense
of individual diversity;
liberty and dignity depended
upon meeting the requirements
of rationality in one's
being and privacy in one's actions.
As Michel Foucault
has pointed out, the central values
of the Enlightenment
.

.

^

required the discipline and self-discipline
of the
rational subject.

It was only the peculiar internal

discipline of the subject that made external,
political
and civil liberty consistent with the
demands of social

3
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oration.

such liberty that
bllnded lndivlduais

^

^

It was the valori2atiQn

^

^
price

s ubjection

schools,

to the disciplines
required in modern
factories, and corporations
.

wmia„

Connolly h as examined
Foucault's work on the
modern construction of
a disciplined
subject as a
counterpoint to the
Enlightenment vision of
"the free,
rational and responsible
agent capable of
consenting
freely to rules, of being
guided by long-term
interests
and principles, and of
being punished for deviation
fr om
those norms to which it has
voluntarily consented. ..4
The
conclusion that he draws,
'

however, is not that we
must

immediately reject the subject
and subject-centered
morality.
He argues that, disciplined
as moderns may be,
"those who have experienced the
affirmative
side of

modern freedom, self-consciousness
and citizenship (the
subject at the level of political
life)
invariably seek
,

to retain and extend this
experience "5
.

that,

H is point is

suspect as modern disciplines may
be, their

positive side is such that even those
who feel the
subjection are reluctant to reject the
positive in order
to eliminate the negative.

We cannot hope merely to

erase the modern self in favor of some
more 'authentic',
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less disciplined being.

„

we acknowledge

^^

order is essential, and
inevitable, then "the
development
of a subject-centered
morality may turn out,
when
compared to other conceivable
alternatives, to be the
-st saiutary way to foster order
through the consent and
endorsement of participants. "6
The long-term project,
then, is to reconstitute
the
subject in a less extreme,
bifurcated manner; it is
to

understand the subject so as
to "enable us to
acknowledge
-others", as Steven White
says. 7 The
•

•

force of work

such as that of Foucault
and the deconstructionists
lies
in the appeal to otherness,
to the desire to re-open
the
world and its possibilities.
Such a desire, however,
often falls short in action.
Aanathematizing closure,
the deconstructionist finds
herself unable to bear

drawing lines that she knows to
be 'fictive'8.

white

notes that feminism is a particularly
active ground for
this problem.
The reason for this,
he says,

while,

on the one hand,

is "that

post-structuralism's emphasis on

otherness is seen by feminists to be salutary,
on the
other hand, they, perhaps more than most
others

influenced by post-structuralism, feel the pull of
the

responsibility to act in an especially acute way." 9
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^^

Lesbian-feminism certainly
has
The most powerful
insights of lesbian .
feminism
centered around the myriad
and sufatle

^^^^

constructed, our potential
perversities smoothed a„a
y;
the best, early work
of Mary Daly and
Adrienne Rich are
particularly strong examples.
However, this project
of
uncovering and questioning,
which has opened the
doors to
positive identity for m any
lesbians, has continually
fallen prey to the closure
necessitated by the attempt
to
construct a new community
and a new history.
in this closure, many
lesbian-feminists have shared

the path of those modern
communitarians who feel the
urgency of the need to combat
social disintegration and
its resultant violence.
The communitarian argument
has

centered around the flimsiness,
the unearthly
abstraction, of the liberal self,
and Maclntyre, Taylor
and Sandel have attempted to
portray
a

'situated'

'thicker',

self that resides inescapably in
language and

social structures.

The implication of their work has

been that this situated self, resting
on understandings
and structures that bind us together
below the level of

self-consciousness, provide a better ground for

discussing political claims and obligations than
does the

165

rational self of contract
theory
eory.

liberalism's opponents is

a wtiLter
better

Tho motivation
The
of
«-

n ffl on earth- it is
life

the justification of
substantive sociai
action.
The rejectlon Qf
liberaiigm is
a

skeleton,

^
fche

.

re ection Qf

an empty frame of
^ucieny that cannot serve
societv
as the basis for any
suoh substantive claim.

tw

The experience of
lesbian-feminism, however,
can
Provide us with clues tQ the
endurance
skeieton
of justice.
The resilience of
liberalism is due
fundamentally to its commitment
to the preservation of
the 'affirmative side'
of the modern subject.
"The
elements particular to
modernity may in principle be
contestable", Connolly tells us- "hm- n,„
us,
y
put these are contests
we are not now in a position
to open. "10 Given our
limited horizon, given our
present constitution as

^

independent subjects and the
self-understandings that
accord with that constitution,
liberalism stands alone in
its commitment to individual
rights and tolerance of
diversity.

Communitarianism, both left and right, is

constantly pressed to reconcile itself
to the premise of

individualism so powerful in the United States.

Even as

they challenge liberalism, American social
movements draw
on the strength of the liberal appeal
to rights and
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autonomy.

Those wh0 appeal to
othgr traditiMs a
often
moving, their voices
a powerful oonstrast
to the
degenerate forms of
individualism to whioh
Merican
society is increasingly
susceptible. And yet they
cannot
entirely dispense with
liberal ideals without
appearing
to exercise a moral
judgment necessarily
suspect.
Whatever leading theoreticians
may believe, many
feminist
lesbians apparently understand
their position and aims
in
essentially liberal terms
and they
,

^

^

^^

so as long as the concern
for individual determination

and rights predominates
over that of community and
order.
in the United States,
the civic republican
tradition has always been challenged
by the fear that

republicans will not act to
protect the minority.

Every

'consensus' has been haunted by
the suspicion that it is
incomplete, perhaps even coercive.
Called upon to

justify their concern in an age
increasingly insecure in
its metaphysics, liberals such
as Rawls returned to Kant

and contract theory to draw the
lines of justice.

As we

see metaphysics replaced by
linguistics and history, the

grounds of contract theory erode once
again.

The

liberal concern, however, lives on, and
is fueled by

post-structuralist thought.

Perhaps, after all,
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Maclntyre is right when he
casts liberals as covert
Nietzscheans (though Nietzsche

is still no liberal),

at

least in the sense that
liberals cannot believe
in the
community (whether linguistic,
political, or otherwisebased) sufficiently to
turn themselves over to
it
completely.
the splintering of modernity,
the
liberal has always been the
one to enlarge the cracks
in
the seemingly smooth walls
of community.
One cannot be
both a genealogist and a
metaphysician; one cannot
deconstruct and remain a communitarian
in the way one was
before. As Connolly explains,
"genealogy is a

m

radicalization... concentrating on the
'strategies' of
power which establish and maintain
the most basic unities
of modernity while suspending
any appeal to rationality
or truth to understand these
constructions
In its current version,

construction of

a

.

"H

liberalism rests upon the

person who has no characteristics that

are of public concern beyond those
necessary for keeping

the peace.

As Michael Sandel has put it, this liberal

self is "prior to its ends" and "prior to its roles
and

dispositions", thus assuring "its independence from
social conventions, and hence its separateness of person,
its individuality". 12

Maclntyre contrasts this to what
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^

calls a "narrative
conception of the self",
that is
"a self constituted
in part by a life
story with a
certain teles". MacXntyre's
conception (as well as
those
of Sandel and Charles
Taylor) does indeed
see, richer and
USefUl f ° r
actual humans than does
the
thin liberal self.
Yet this is only one
among several
Possibilities. Another choice
could be that between
the
narrative self and the
constructed subject of Foucault.
This is perhaps the more
relevant battle ground in
current theory. Both concepts
are historically rich,
,

standing
,

capable of situating persons
in actual social

circumstances and discussing them
on the level of
expressed self-understandings and
aspirations.
The two
approaches are directly opposed,
however, in their
evaluation of those understandings.
The narrative self, as described
by Maclntyre,

that self which is inevitably
located in

a

is

particular

social and historical space which gives
the meaning to

her thoughts, choices, and actions.

The aim of his

conception is to make sense of the life of an
individual.
In contrast,

Foucault'

s

constructed subject is the

creature, not of sense, but of power.

His genealogies of

social institutions deprive the subject of any capacity
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to justify and
explain itself and
u the
Lne rel.r
relations which
form it.

The narrative self
is bound to

^-

^

^

But this is not the
charge tQ be

^
^

by Post-structuralists,
for any constructed,
nontranscendental self shares
this same limitation.
The
Problem with the conception
of a narrative or
expressive
self is that it Mocks
critique even within
those
horizons.
This self is treated
as independent of
power
relations, because the fact
of construction is
not taken
seriously enough. The
acknowledgement that
we are

constituted, which is the first
step away from an
atomistic liberalism, must be
followed by the question:
by what or whom are we so
built? The
answer,

or 'culture', or 'tradition',

'language',

is hardy an answer
unlesg

it is followed by more
questions: Who controls the

language,

culture, and tradition?

What interests and

purposes are served by the present
constitution of the
self?

The

theorists of an expressive self decline
to

answer these questions.

Contrasting the projects of

Taylor and Foucault, Michael Shapiro
says that
"Taylor's perspective would close questions
that Foucault' s analysis opens up.
Operating
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within a notion of discourse. =<expressive of
what is fundamental i^K
h an
Taylor
would endorse the sel?

™2 ™

lent^^hereas^c^ft^^refLt:
lnt

have been given this
self -13

SimUarly
'

^^yre's

contrast to the abstract,

^

'

h^

how we

°

narrative self is a useful

'thin'

self of liberal theory.

But it too fails to
answer our needs today.

m

his

return to a vocabulary of
tradition and community,
Maclntyre is forced to
continue the search for the
good
as something transcending
particularities
.

^

Not only is

he unable to ask the
questions concerning power and
the
self, he is unwilling,
for it is precisely against
those

questions that he is arguing.

His whole project is aimed

at throwing a veil over
the Enlightenment,

behave as though it had never
happened.

asking us to

Specifically,

Maclntyre hopes to derail the
nihilism that he blames for
modern bureaucratic domination.
Perhaps it is the facts of Maclntyre'
that account for this.

s

own existence

Certainly, bureaucratic

domination and the irrational violence that
is its twin
are major problems for modernity.

However, he overlooks

the fact that many humans today can only
locate

a

tradition and

a

a

community by denying themselves
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language,

a

spouse,

=o m fortable with

or
r otherwise
otherwi
v>^«
hiding themselves.

We

Madntyre's soothing words
of conver .

sation and oonfiict within
tradition.
Those who have
never been aliowed in
any co mm unity or
tradition in the
first place may reasonably
be even more doubtful.

Power and Community

It is this abiding
skepticism that fuels liberalism.

Far from being a doctrine
of progress, liberalism
was, as
Sheldon Wolin tells us, "a
philosophy of sobriety, born
in fear, nourished by
disenchantment, and prone to
believe that the human condition
was and was likely to
remain one of pain and anxiety. "15
The product Qf

religious war, liberalism is the
true political theory of
the analytic of finitude." its
birth presumed two
things.

First, the eternal truth of God's
will was not

manifestly evident to humans in any
publicly accessible
way.

Second,

relations on earth are relations of power

and utility as well as love, that,
indeed, we are

afforded no certain basis for distinguishing love
from
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Power or utility beyond
our oonscious,
conscientious
subjectivity.
Behind the communitariani
sm of both right and
left
lies the belief that
power is opposed to love
and com-

™

S

1S

- ident -

the writings of radical

feminists (indeed, most
feminists)

work of Taylor and Maclntyre.

m

,

as well as in the

contrasting (good,

community and (bad, power,
communitarians have sought to
relocate the grounds of
community as a way to oppose
power; or, rather, they
have opposed power in order
to
establish community.
in contrast,

liberals and post-structuralists
have

both stressed the extent to
which community is
of power.

a

vehicle

This power operates precisely
through the

codes that the community endorses,
the codes that define
identity and action, and it is
irremovable from them.
if
this is so, then the question becomes
not how to remove

power but how to live with it; not what
power is

transcendentally legitimate, but rather, what
power is
necessary for what purposes.

The liberal focus on

justice and rights is the approximation of these
questions.

Denying any claim to know the good, liberals have

nonetheless been sufficiently moved by the claims of
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metaphysics to try to establish

a

transcendental standard

of justice in a hostile
environment.

What liberalism promises,
then, is a possible
line
of defense for human
dignity in the face of
totalizing

normalizing discourse.

However,

or

contemporary liberals

are mistaken as to the
source of this defense
which has
never, and will never find
a sufficient motive
in logic
and analysis. What is
precious, what is needed is
the
liberal sentient, that which
appreciates, even enjoys,
the ambiguity and contestation
of public life.
The
bearer of such a sentiment need
not abstract from the

particulars of my existence to respect
me; neither must
she agree that my understanding
of a good
life is the

true,

that

the best, the purest.
I

mean what

I

What she need do is believe

say; that is,

she must agree to treat

me as a being competent to speak of
my own desires and

motives directly (even if she suspects
that
The

x

truth'

I

am not)

of psychological theories of self-

construction cannot be sufficient grounds for the
hegemony of these discourses and explanations.

Once we

acknowledge the extent to which discourses of depth
structure function as vehicles of power, we can once
again attempt to draw

a

line between the truth-status of

a

^

description and its impllcit
demands Qn policy
awareness that I a ra neurotic
or unaware of my
oppression
_

or in other ways

'defective'

should not be allowed to

function as a reason to ignore
or denigrate my
understandings and desires.

self-

As they began, lesbian-feminists
fought to wrest the
understandings and construction
of lesbian identity from
the grip of those who denigrated
the self-understandings
of lesbian women.
the process, however, they
fell
into the trap awaiting all
moderns, all subjects of the

m

regime of truth; the trap of
counter-reif ication, of
justifying their existence by reference
to

transcendental standards of what
means,

and where she fits.

a

(new)

lesbian is, what she

But lesbians are not the only

ones for whom this trap las lain in
wait.

The first

victims, not surprisingly, were the white
bourgeois men

who sought a justification in truth for
liberal theory.
The initial argument of liberalism relied on

constructed man,

a

a

being with powers of reason and

a

propensity for unreasonableness that sanctioned his
inclusion in public affairs along clearly defined,

neutralized lines.

Those who did not fit the criteria

simply did not have any place in public life.
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^

The primary challenge
to liberai

(reasoneble,

iiberel man

.

^

The communitarian

been to find what people
actually ate like, as
a way of
discovering w hat we are
actually cue. The
struggles of
lesbians over the past
thirty years, however,
should tell
us that -peopie' are
not 'actually like-

any^;

and

that the experience of
oppression h as less to do
with
"hat we are told we are
like th an it does with
the
rigidity with which we are
told what we are like,
what we
mean, and how we should
manifest that meaning. The

opposite of oppression in this
sense is, not truth or
respect, but humor or
llghtheertedness - the humor that
comes from seeing all categories,
all explanations, all
identities as provisional. Such
a sense is rooted in the
appreciation of ambiguity that is
antithetical to all
metaphysics, including 'liberatory'
metaphysics."

A strong implication of this
dissertation has been
the idea that the truths of our
lives are not to be found
(exclusively)

in our self-representations.

By this

I

mean that not only do we not understand
the consequences
of our generalized statements, but
we do not in fact live

the lives that our theoretic
representations would
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SU996st
-

Far from bei

- * —ss,

this is , rather/ the

strength of human life
exceeding verbali 2a tion.
It has
been acknowledged in .
partial way fay those
on the fringes of
f em inist theory women of color
working olass women,
sex radicals'.
The demand
feminists begin their
analysis with the lives
of women
rather than academic
philosophy reflects the
sense that
feminist theory is yet
another white, middle-class
outpost, another weapon
of assi m ilation
However, these
"underclass" women often imply
that, as marginal group
members, they have a full
awareness of the sources,
meanings, and effects of
their acts that is denied
to
members of hegemonic groups.
They revive the logic of
Hegel's master/slave relation,
but forget that the

^^^
^

-

.

slave's superior consciousness
is yet not complete.
For
the fact' of marginality does
not make one an expert on
the culture, any more than
hegemony
does.

There is, nonetheless, much to be
learned outside
the circle of theoretical dominance.

In particular,

one

may learn a different problematic,
and different

problems.

The fears of communitarian philosophers,
while

not entirely misguided by any means, may
be exaggerated

by their focus on the words spoken in the
culture.

The
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words of mod ern liberal
culture are bereft of
any
conduce in a reai g ood, real
standards for l iving
,
real co mm unity.
y et the actions
Qf participants
more confidence than
the words
uros.
Thi^v,
This should not surprise
us.
As actual existent
beings, we can no
.ore suspend
belief than we can suspend
breath.
The density of
reality, rat her than
its elusiveness, is
what surrounds
us.
in such a world, what
is needed is a history a
genealogy, a counter- mem oryl8
that opposes
of reality, the density
of interpretation.
We do not
need to prove that we
exist, in the .anner of
.etaphysics
- which is, to prove that
we have the right to
exist.
We
do exist,
we live our lives,
inescapably, with existing
others.
to justify this by
defining, by ontologizing,
by
tracing descent, is to suggest
that our present existence
is open to dispute.

„

^

One of the mediocre strengths
of liberalism is its
acceptance of this sense of inevitability
in reality.
The world of the liberal is a
world in which, as Isaiah
Berlin put it, "human goals are
many, not all of them

commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry
with one
another". 19

In this world,

least partially,

conflicts can be seen, at

for what they are: conflicts between

h

~.

A theory that would
minimi2e

kn ° W itS intSreSt
or

^^^^ ^

its true identity
or

community or history,
fails not so much
because
wrong as because it
draws dangerous
conciusions.
i may
be neurotic, or deviant,
or male-identified;
however, a
liberal win not deprive
me Qf my
because of that, nor wiil
: be excommunicated.
„y
membership is a reality,
more fundamental than
any
justification for or against
it.
if my memb er s hip is
not
that of a first-class
citizen, liberalism puts
the onus
on my opponents rather
than on myself. Metaphysics
has
been put to use to justify
exclusions;

^ ^

that does not mean

that metaphysics must be
used to justify inciusion.
All
that is required is the refusal
to accept the exclusion.

Political Strategies

Does this mean that all lesbians
groups)
sense,

(or other

need ask for is 'a piece of the pie'?
yes.

marginal

m

a

The pie has been baked by a particular

historical configuration of men.

The inclusion of other

people will of necessity change that configuration

-

not

because women or non-„
hlte s or workers are
inherently
virtuous, out simply
beC a use they
are different.

The

suggestion that assimilation
will be total reflects
either a lack of confluence
in the strength of
marginal
Pecples, or an ahistorical
belief in the capitalist,
male-dominated modern world,
without sounding facile,
I
want to suggest that
strategies of entry are,
at this
pcint, more directly radical
than strategies of
withdrawal or revolt 20. The
creatiQn

^

^

non-hegemonic cultural resources
and community are
encouraging, stimulating
developments.
They will be

more

so as they decline to
reify and discipline their

participants
What exactly does this mean
for lesbians?
as members of one of the
primary 'deviant'

Lesbians,

classes in

society, have attempted to
counter the prevailing

stereotypes of their lives by a
variety of strategies.
In the lesbian-feminist strategy,
the priority is on the

creation of a community and
lesbian

a

a

history that will offer the

sense of belonging rather than exclusion,

positive identity through membership in
a

culture of its own

that denied them.

-

a

culture,

a

group that has

in fact superior to

On the other hand a 'reformist'

1

"rate gy

-d

HO

has focussea on the
elimination of

legal barriers t0
membership

^

^

^

and on the development
of a sense of pride,
not as
lesbians per se, but as
persons who are lesbian.
The second path has
been characterized by
lesbianfe m inists and others
as mere assimilation,
the denial of
one's true self in order
to participate.
The two
strategies, in fact, reflect
the conflict that is
endemic
to modernity: given
the current
lwl ract
fact of otherness
within
the self, given the
consensus among theorists
that

contemporary societies exact

a

high price for stability

and order, we are faced,
as Connolly has noted,
with the
choice between a vision "in
which the goal is to

integrate otherness into more
perfect forms of
identification with the will of a
rational community" and
one which suggests that "we
should strive to create more
institutional space to allow otherness
21
to be".

what

j

hope to have demonstrated, through
examination of

lesbian-feminism as

a

communitarian project, is that the

first option is not available to us
as we are presently

constituted: that otherness is

a

constant, harassing

presence which will not vanish under any
political or
discursive regime in modernity, and that acceptance
of

tMS

fact must be the bas
* «" •** future politics
lesbians, for women,
for heterosexual
white men.

.

for

^_

This in turn suggests
that the polities
of refor m
^s severs! advantages. First
it doe£
to define and to
subjectify one's differenoe
in order to
claim rights. Within
the lesbian-feminist
community,
-hership is baS ed on standards
no less restrictive
than
the iarger society,
and these standards
have so far
not shown themselves
to be
e surriciently
suffir imt ,
unproblematic
that their restrictiveness
should be overlooked.
if
anything, this community
is under more pressure
to
justify its standards,
because it is less diffuse
and
-re intimate than the heterosexual
culture surrounding
it.
The comparison to medieval
society is apt in this
regard.
Excommunication was not simply
a matter of
iosing one's political
rights or one's job; it
involved
the loss of the structure
of one's life - friends,
Church, family, God.
To the extent that lesbians
form an
insular community, members face
similar risks in
,

^

-

challenging common beliefs.

In contrast,

broader-based

reform movements may work without
insisting that

participants adhere to

a

'way of life', thus leaving
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issues of other
differsnces open to
volatile level.

^

^

^

A second advantage
is that, while
reform movements
support than co mm unity
strategies, they in
fact raay
achieve .ore.
Specifically, mainstream
efforts may
provide their actors with
a strong persona!
identity that
xs more resilient
than that offered by
alternative
comities, because it is broader
based.
A lesbian raay
indeed find herself capable
of alliance and even
friehdship - even community with straight women, as
well as with men of all
sorts, that will prove
more
personally durable as well
as politically effective.
The
community of lesbian-feminists,
to the extent that it
ignores the society surrounding
it, runs the continual
risk of reaction and oppression
by that
society.

it is

inconceivable that an attitude of
hostility and
separation will engender anything
other than itself; few
of us are in a position to
make that worthwhile.

not a caution against any
agitation.

It is,

This is

rather,

suggestion that such action must be
conducted in

a

a

spirit

of goodwill and hope for common
action rather than one
that suspects even potential allies.

This is
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increasing being recognized

fay

are broadening their
politics

fcQ

lesblan _ feminists

of co mmunity and the
need for a poi tics
.

beyond community boundaries.

m

line with this consideration,

^

^^^
^^
rates

it is worth

remembering the debate,
described in Chapter Two,
between
the liberal psychiatrists
and their conservative
and
radical opponents.
The conservatives and
radicals were
united in their perception
that the issue of sexuality
went beyond personal choice
of lifestyle.

The simple
liberal denial that medical
evaluations of sexual difference were relevant to social
or political judgments gave
way in the face of the
agreement of the major antagonists
that in fact they were.
The reaction of lesbianfeminists to this was to deny the
authority of medical
discourse, using the negative images
of the conservatives
as examples of the fundamental
misogyny of patriarchal

society.

The gay rights activists, on the
other hand,

fought to change the images held by
the majority of

Americans, and to remove homosexuality
from the category
of pathology.

.
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The Withdrawal of
Meaning from Difference

The history of
lesbian-feminism and the
inslght fc
offers int0 the problems
of liberalism may
afford us an
opening into what changes
are needed to make
a perspective so basic to
America as liberalism
is not
,

Pathoiogicai to it.

In particular,

this history may help

us to distinguish the
heart of liberalism
from its

unnecessary appendages and
parasitic growths, and to
free
it from the
misunderstandings of both
defenders and
opponents
The final gr0U nd of
the question of liberalism,
we
have seen, is the question
of the self - how it is

constituted and how it is to
be treated.

The basic

question that arises from this
study is whether sexuality
is inevitably so fundamental
to social organization as
it
has seemed, or more exactly,
in
what ways and for what

purposes it may have this status.

While the liberals

were naive in suggesting that at
present sexuality need
not be so explosive, they were perhaps
pointing in the
right direction after all.

As long as we agree that "it

is sex itself which hides the most
secret parts of the

individual, the structure of his fantasies, the roots
of
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his ego, the forms
of

Ms

^

relatlonship

^

reautyii22
d
that we cannot live
in common with
different sexualities,
We will he
be forced
fnrrpH +-«
to impose 'proper'
sexuality on
ourselves and othpr<?
a„
tnerS
As
we Prepare ourselves
to
question the nature and
status of sexualitv
sexuality, we become
open to reevaluate
the claims of otherness
in our lives
It becomes possible
to imagine rights
as adhering, not
simply to the approved
subject, but to the
self as that
which encompasses both
subjectivity and otherness.
This will not be mere
assimilation; neither will
tt
be simple liberalism.
It win, however
dra „ on
liberal notion of rights,
and on the high valuation
of
individual freedom and dignity
characteristic of
•

"

^

,

liberalism

„ e can safely dispense with such
ideas only
as long as we trust that
our community will never
arrive
at a truth that requires
our subjugation;
.

few

be so secure.

of us can

The way to a decent life
seems to be

almost the opposite of the
communitarian ideal. Rather
than find or develop the
community within which security
and dignity are to be found,
we need to focus our

imagination again on our differences,
actual and
potential.

Recognition of commonality leads to com-

passion and care, qualities sorely
needed today; however,

186

without

humble recognition
tion of th*
«
the ffundamental
y
otherness
of others, we cannot
do them justice
iustirp *c
as hhuman
a

agents.

Liberalism survived in the
past by denying that
Qur
differences were so f U n dam
entai as to present
obstacles
to community.
it ignored
„
difference m
^ ^iiierence,
moving
to the
abstract ground of a 'thin
self deserving of rights.
This move has been briiii
a nt ly
thoroughly oritici Z ed by
writers such as sandal,
Taylor, and Maclntyre.
The
,

solution will not come,
however, from attacking
the
citadel in the name of our
essential embodiment or
constitution through language.
Such arguments
demonstrate that the liberal
self is a fiction.
They
not speak to that within

us'

do

which never quite fits the

public boundaries, which defies
the explanations of
social construction.
There is,
indeed, no one so

pathetic as the subject who fits
without trouble, without
thought,

into public parameters.

Such a subject is

thoroughly subjected, fit only to
be ruled.

The fact of

our social construction must be
placed alongside the fact

that our construction values individuality
as well as

community.

This cannot be disposed of by appeals to
a

'higher self in which individuality and community
are
reconciled.

The best modernity seems to offer is the

capacity to live with
the tension hetween
the two, the
Proper recognition of
difference as well as

totality

What exactly

difference,

is

the proper recognition
of

Perhaps at this point

stating what it is not.

-dernity will not

!

can he ciearer hy

Relief from the bonds
Qf

co me fro m the efforts
of those groups

previously defined by a
disciplinary discourse to
legitimate 'their' nrnnn
group.
This means

that groups must

resist fighting simply
for 'gay right s' or
'women's
rights' or 'civil rights'
for any group as a group.
what
must be engaged in is a
questioning of the process
whereby such groups are
defined and formed. The
proper
recognition of difference does
not involve a simple
tolerance for 'other' groups,
but requires a wholesale
reexamination of the lines of
exclusion drawn in

modernity and

a

reevaluation of the aims and needs

expressed in these divisions.

This does not imply that

all barriers to desire will be
eliminated; as we saw in

Chapter Four, the sexual libertarian
goal remains flawed
by its inability to deal with the
facts of social power,

even as the libertarians reveal the
complicity of

lesbian-feminism with the order it hopes to oppose.

It

seems increasingly plausible that no desire is innate,
to
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be privileged over
othersS

to be
hn
t0

'

while others explain
themselves
es

*

reused from examinatior
.
To t-h*
th e extent
that

sexuality is a me ans
of control, a channel
of social
Power, all of i ts forms
are equally iraplicated
maintenance of order.

^

^

The result of this
knowledge need not be
a micro-

scopic examination into
the details of each
individual's
sexuality. A l ibe ral
may draw the conclusion
that in
fact it is precisely
this that commands
us to respect one
another's privacy, to
refrain from confessing
or
deeding confession, and to
seriously reconsider demands
that we 'be' hetero- or
homo-, perverted or
normal,
marginal or central. We
need to see what is at
stake in
the categories we have
made and to decide whether
we
wish to or need to maintain
those lines,
is the
,

heterosexual family in fact the
'fundamental building
block of society'? how is
that changing under
capitalism? what exactly does
this imply for those who
do not find themselves in
such a family - and how does
the presence of these 'others'
impact on that family?

the centrality of the modern
family threatened by the

presence of alternatives?

Is that good or bad?

these questions need serious
examination.

All

We need to

is

189

take seriously the
possibility that societies
ra ay
survive, even thrive,
with more diversity
than
afforded us in modernity.

^

It is here,

ironically, that the
liberal co.es to
her forte.
For Poucault tells
us that the proble
ra with
-dern political theory is not
so mu ch that it is
th
it is irrelevant.
In theory, we hear,
we have
not yet "cut off the
King's head".
oblivious to the
passing of the age of power
as force, theorists
absorb

-

wr^

"

themselves in questions of
sovereignty and right. 23
And
certainly, among moderns,
liberals are preeminent in
this
absorption.
Poucault does not tell us
clearly what it is
that we are to substitute
for these conceptions,
but his

elucidation of the power/knowledge
nexus is meant to open
a new avenue that will
eliminate the obfuscation that
results from asking the wrong
questions.
Until that time, however, the
discourse that is most
capable of challenging the
disciplinary powers is that of
politics. Murray Edelman's point
about the 'helping

professions' is apt: therapeutic discourse
serves to
justify actions that otherwise would
be protested as
tyranny24.

In its focus Qn physical acts and boundarieS/

liberal political discourse serves to expose
the

presumptions behlnd any
language used
It does,

of course,

Predispositions.

hOWCTer

13 that
'

^

.

ustify

carry lt . own
presumptlons

^

The strength of
liberal

*

a commitment to
treat power

as power when it is
revealed as such,

and that its

commitment to libertv
iberty is r,r
of a sort that may
be contrasted
with commitments to a
common good, pride,
self-

deter.ination, authentic being,
or any other, without
suggesting that these things
are liberty 25.
It is
very barrenness of liberal
discourse that is its
occasional strength as well
as its weakness.
In forcing
us to rise above the
distinctions inscribed in social
practice and language,
liberalism provides a ground
for
challenging even those upon
which it rests. The question
then is not what are we
to substitute

^

for a barren,

pernicious legacy, but rather,
how can we infuse it with
life and meaning? This is
the problem awaiting us.
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CHAPTER SIX

DEMOCRATIC INDIVIDUALITY
AND THE RENOVATION
OF
LIBERALISM

Do

I

contradict myself?

Very well then
(I

am large,

I

I

contradict myself,

contain multitudes)
-Walt Whitman

in treating the problems
of liberalism,

George Kateb

has suggested that "the
renovation of liberalism" must
be
based on a theory of "democratic
individuality" that goes
beyond "either the Whig tradition
or the theoretical
consecration of the private life
of property-acquisition
within the uncitizenly safety of
undemocratic rule".l
What is needed, in his view, is
a foundation for

liberalism that sees the individual
as basic and sacred
while acknowledging social construction
and the reality

of a community beyond the level of
contract.

This

foundation will be neither Kantian nor
utilitarian, for

neither school has

a

satisfactory conception of what we

are and how we are bound together.

The Kantian attempts

to ground rights and justice in a soil
beyond contract or

community, but she does so only by abandoning democracy
196
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as well.

The utilitarian, on
the other hand, cannot
Provide an account of
individual rignts and
respect
resxsts social expediency.
What Kateb argues for
is "a

^

developed theory of individual
integrity as "the
necessary foundation of the
theory of democratic
individuality.-^ Such a
theory

win

resist the

encroachments of power, whatever
its source.
This
resistance begins with the
detachment from existing
social conventions that
is characteristic of
selfconscious creatures. Such
detachment does not demand
rejection of convention, but
does require the
acknowledgement that "all social
conventions are, in
fact, conventions - i.e.,
artificial; that they are

changeable; that conventions
have in fact changed through
time, and are different from
place to place. "3
Given
the fact of self-consciousness,
this detachment is

essential for an honest, self-critical
life; the only

alternative seems to be "justifying old
inhibitions on a
new basis". 4 Detachment, Kateb says,
is needed to
"defend the individual against regulation
by any agency
that is starkly and publicly distinct
from the

individual", but also "against regulation by
any less

specifiable force that seems to permeate society and

5
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threatens to take in the
susceptible individual"
To those within the
Aristotelian tradition,
such
detachment bespeaks nihilism.
The recognition of
the
conventional nature of sori^i
social l lfe and
institutions seems
to them to suggest
that no order
uer ls
is to
t0 ho
b e preferred over
any other.
The insistence of
liberals that they are
not
bound to a teleology
reinforces this suspicion.
However,
it appears that both
liberals and their critics
are
mistaken as to the nature
of ^widusm.
liberalism
Th»
rhe „
concern for
detachment and the recognition
of convention are
themselves rooted in a conception
of human telos that is
grounded in the capacity for
rational
.

choice.

Such a

telos requires that we be
able to distinguish what
is
essential to life, what is
'natural', from what is open
to debate and judgment.
This distinction does not imply
that all convention is equal,
or inaccessible to reasoned
discussion,
fact, such discussion can
only be rooted
in the recognition that some
things are conventional.

m

This capacity to abstract from
our circumstances is in
fact the fundamental condition of
philosophy.
Such abstraction, however, must not
be confused with
the isolation of the self in a cloister
of truth.

Resistance to the encroachments of power does not
imply
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withdrawal from society

.

Liberals

^^^

-volves power relations,
and they accept that
fact
without becking cynical
or nihilistic.

The position of

the cynic is, as always,
but the protected face
of
disappoints, only by involving
oneself in public life
on every level can one
hope to prevent abuse
and
usurpation.
The practice of critical
detachment is not
the hysterical separation,
the denial of connection,
that
is so prevalent in
contemporary America; it is
in fact

based upon, and consists

in,

an understanding of both
the

solidity and importance of
human connection and its
dangers

From this, we can see that
the creation of
individuality is not a mere matter
of possessive
individualism, nor of "domestic
privatism".

The claims

of individuality may work
against acquisitiveness as well
as against friendship,

when those become opposed to/ my

ability to live a life of integrity.

The self that is to

be nurtured is not simply given,
placed in a social
setting, but is also able to,

barriers of the given.
of the 'Other',

valued.

indeed must, transcend the

As such,

it will include elements

of the weak and despised as well as the

A liberalism built on this foundation will be
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grounded on empathy as
wen
well as nn,H
prudence, compassion as
well as contract.

^

Kateb cautions, however
ever, f^f
that
abolish distance only
,

..

it _„ 6

empathy cannot

^^

ac

^

t

^

statement, we must be wa
ry of any poUtioal
theory that
proposes to baseS ltSSlf
it-o 0 f to
° exclusively on empathy.
While we clearly need * Qr^ 0 *
Y
a space for empathy,
this space
cannot be the only arena
for purines.
politics
A, aan enterprise
As
conducted among adversaries
and competitors as well
as
friends and partners, a
viable politics requires
that we
engage both in locating
our commonalities and in
i

providing for our differences.

Small or exclusive

communities are necessary for
the provision of roots and
security; these must be
nurtured and strengthened in
the
face of their erosion and
the increasing

bureaucratization of public life.

However, the present

historical configuration of the
nation-state will not
evaporate in the foreseeable future,
and we need to work
for more equitable relations
within that configuration

even as we nurture local community.

These larger

relations cannot be built on empathy,
but must find their

ground in understandings and respect that
recognize our
differences as well as our commonalities.

Attacks on the
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based in

e m path y

or compassion.

They are attacks

^

Politics as an enterprise
conducted by humans who
are
separated and suspicious
of one another as
well as
connected. Liberal
notions Qf

^

^^

conceptions of govern rae nt
as an arrangement
for the
accomplishment of Umited
ends, are denigrated
by male
communitarians as unrealistic
and destructive, and
by
-ny feminists as reflective
of a masculine realit
y which
pathologically oriented toward
denial of connection 7
What all of these
criticisms share is the
implication
that our lives should
be seamless wholes,
where we can
move from 'private' to
'public' and bac* again
with the
same goals, same
expectations, same selves
in each
setting.
This assumption must be
seriously re-evaluated
before liberal (or non-liberal)
theory can progress.
The communitarian argument
rests on the belief that
by dispensing with the elements
that blind or distort our
vision, we will reach agreement
on the questions facing

-

us;

it is based on what Connolly
calls an 'ontology of

concord'.

8

what has not been forthcoming, Don
Herzog has

written, is "an account of what
commitments should bind
us,

what content the communal attachments
that should
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transcend our individual
proj ects should have,
what
exactly the common
good should be" 9 ln f
ract, „

^

the charge of
'incompleteness'

i
J-&
s

he argues,

perhaos m
pernaps
n
more
accurately

directed against
liberalism's critics
critics.
get down to substantive

wh
When we actually

id eaXs and goals

communitarians
splinter, when they do
not abandon the f iei
d altogether.
As we saw, lesbian-feminists
and conservative
,

psychiatrists have shared a
critigue of liberalism
while
maintaining opposite positions
on the substantive
issue
before them. Such disputes
are a constant of social
life.

The liberal position
is precisely an attempt
to
discover what we can and
must agree upon; accepting
that
most issues are not amenable
to settled agreement among
all members of society,
adhering to a 'philosophy of
dissonance', xiuerais
liberal
t-™ to lay a ground
try
for safe,
,

<?

i

dignified coexistence. 10
H.N. Hirsch has said that
"the problem of

contemporary liberalism is not the
absence of community,
but rather the manner in which
liberalism defines the
mature,

'deserving' self, and, by so doing,
distributes

the fundamental rights of citizens. "11

that

Thus

,

he argues
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f^

^
AT

be ten a
ng
fl
understanding of the "unity"
?- d)
o
'
although they define the
essence off that self
^sence
in different terms
3
ive, both
UberarindividuaUsHnd P6rSPSCt
communitarianism might be
viewed as complevlewed
mentary modes of
^
1PUne betra Ving,
in both cases, the
t"
y ambl
amh 9 u °«s and anarchic
V
nature of the self. 12

Ti TT

tw

™

Ji„

,

'

From this perspective,
the antidote to a
sterile
liberalism is not a community
that can mediate
between
self and other in a more
satisfying way, or one
that will
embody the teles of the
individual, but a reformulation
of the self that is
granted respect and membership
in the
community.
This reformulation will
have the specific
form of a l oosening of claims
from a metaphysical
hierarchy of personal attributesaLiriDuces, it will v,
be grounded on
an appreciation of differences
that cannot, will not be
named or categorized. The
problem with liberalism is not
that it is insufficient, but
that it fails to go far
i

i

enough; it betrays its fundamental
insight of irreducible

plurality by reducing that plurality
to

a

list of

possible axes of differentiation and
deciding which axes
are deserving of public recognition.

In their guest for

a

deeper community, American opponents of liberalism
have

.
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too often sought to
a*es.

reformats

or rehierarchize
the

Real change, however,
requires
f° r
'

^

™^ate

questioning the

arenas of, such differenti-

ation.

By calling attention
to the funda.ental
status of
the co«„i to heterosexuality,
lesbian-fe.inists brought
to light one of these
axes.
The worx before us,
now, is
to question the nature
and necessity of the
hetero/ ho m o
axis in its entirety.
Anythlng less

wiu

^^^

justice to the true extent
and depth of our
multiplicities
The liberal polity
represents a determined effort
to
find a common ground that
nonetheless supports the claims
of the individual against
the community.
To the extent
that it has shown itself to
be susceptible to capture
or

exploitation by non-political powers,
it must be
challenged to change. To eliminate

it in favor of a

tighter, more authentic regime,
however, is to deliver us
over entirely to those powers, be
they economic,

religious, medical, or any other.

The twin facts of

plurality and power mandate that we acknowledge
the
limited,

controversial nature of any process or policy,

even as we seek to defend it.

We must develop

conceptions of society and economy that do not rely on

,
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the notion of an essential, authentic self for their

critical force, and yet provide

a

ground for opposing

impositions and systematic inequalities.

Lesbian-

feminism's strength has lain in its ability to expose
deep structures such as compulsory heterosexuality

thereby reminding us that constructions of self are in
fact constructions.

Its continuing struggle is to

maintain and develop these insights without retreating
into essentialism or facile explanations of enduring

differences.

The need for an identity rooted in a

community and

a

history is real; so also is the need to

self-consciously transcend that community in order to
complete identity.

Individuality must be tied to, and

transcend, community if it is to be vital and meaningful.
It is to this difficult,

central human dilemma that

political theory and organization addresses itself.

We

can be faithful to our existence only if we acknowledge
its endurance beyond any politics.

The final issue for theorists now,

content of theories

-

is no longer the

it is the activity of theorizing

itself, the foundation of theory in certain forms of

discourse.
of,

The shift of modernity is partly a product

and partly due to, the shift in philosophy from
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ontology to epistemology 13
yy
.

~.
This
inis sh
qh ift
provided a new

agenda for political
theory
eory, in
ln t-W
that -v,
theories' groundwork
could now lie less
lpc<? on
r,r.
the answer to the
question

'what is
the right order?' and
more on that
tnat to t-v,
the question 'what
can TC know about the
right order?'
Liberalism's

m

rejection or earlier teleology

is

based in lts minimal

answer to the latter
question, just as Aristotle
deals
with the former. The
fact of the primacy
of epistemology
leaves any return to
teleology open to the
Nietzschean
dismissal - as long as the
epistemological question is
treated rationalistically,
as the definitive
question,
and one that must be
answered in universal terms.
To the

rationalistic mind, the denial
either that the
epistemological issue is primary
or that an acceptable
answer be universal is
tantamount to nihilism, without
transcendental standards, it is
feared, we will be left

with nothing but naked power.

By this time, however,

Foucault has made us painfully
aware that, in modernity,
power moves precisely through such
transcendental
standards. 14

The question for us now is whether
the

attempt at universals is doomed,
or whether there may be
a way to frame some

standards of morality and justice in

such a manner as to increase both
self-understanding and
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~ty.
dear,

Some such project/
of a

is essential if we
are to make any
progress as

Political thinners and
actors.

A change in attitude

towards greater recognition
of reality

-nifest
with

in individuals,

-

of the humanity

beyond statistics and
categories

a

corresponding movement in
theorizing from a
'scientific' to a
'conversational' mode - these
are the
avenues to new and fruitful
theory.
-

Michael Oakeshott distinguishes
between conceptions
of human intercourse as
inquiry and as conversation
thus:
In a conversation the
participants are not
ag
° r 3 dGbate; the
1*
"ru
truth
t h? to be discovered,
no proposition to be
proved, no conclusion sought.
They are not
concerned to inform, to persuade,
or to refute
one

-

d^^^

-

another and therefore the
cogency of their
utterances does not depend upon
their all
speaking in the same idiom; they
may differ
without disagreeing...
conversation, 'facts'
appear only to be resolved once
more into the
possibilities from which they were
made;
certainties' are shown to be combustible,
not
by being brought in contact with
other
'certainties' or with doubts, but by
being
kindled by the presence of ideas of
another
order; approximations are revealed
between
notions normally remote from one another. 15

m

In conversations there are many
voices,

some recog-

nizable from experience, others seemingly
new and
strange.

However,

all are to be treated equally and
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respected for what thev
ey ar-P*
are indeed,
conversation "is
lmpossible in the ab
* diversity of voices:
in

Cerent

—

-

-

unlverses of discourse

other and enjoy an
oblique

^

^

it

r eXations h ip

which neither
requires nor forer^t-o
u
rorecasts their being
assimilated to one
another ."16
•

This idea, however,
is constantly
imperiled: "For
each voice is prone
to
that is , an exclusive
concern with its own
utterance, which may
result in its
identifying the conversation
with itself and its
speaking
as if it were speaking
only to itself. And
when this
happens, barbarism may be
observed to have supervened. "17
The barbarism of modernity
lies in the domination
of

^p^,

human conversation by two
voices: that of 'science'
and
that of practical activity.
Under their sway, the

conversation has degenerated into
a pair of monologues,
interrupted by occasional squabbles
over territory.

prime piece of turf, of course,
is politics.

The

For

whatever may be said about the various
sources of meaning
in our lives, politics is a
constant.
However, the

nature of politics, its relevance and
its forms, are

conceived in several ways, each with their
characteristic
evaluation of that conceived activity.
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Conceptions of politics
have been a problem

Particular

for

Orleans,

whose natural law
heritage

leaves us so suspicious
of compromise, of
decisions made
on a level other
than 'principle-.
Politics is f or us a
mUrkY
bUSl
'
lahel someone or
southing
'Political' is t0 place it
in dlrect
ideal of truth or ju stice
that is so potent in
the United
States.
The slogan that 'the
personal is political' d
oes
not m ean simply that
our private lives are
informed by
Public understandings, nor
that they involve
negotiation
and compromise; its tone
is one of accusation,
of
exposure. Must that always
be the case? There is
insight in the slogan and in
the awareness that generated
it which we must acknowledge
and accept. However, when
Placed in the content of American
confusion over the
nature of politics and the
political, the slogan - and
the awareness - may be seen
to be fundamentally

^ —-

-

^^^^ ^

disruptive of the possibility of that
conversation so
essential for our human survival and
development.
The
cautions of Maclntyre sound extreme
and in some sense

misguided in the safe halls of academe.

But his

portrayal, as well as his predictions, are
altogether

plausible if we do not break out of the nihilistic
trap
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laid for us by rationalism

Sciphoo
bcience

powerful as it is,
will not arrive at the
'truth'
truth of uhumans and
their
'

'

it is the only alternative
to a rbitrary power.

Our huraan

conversation must expand
to introduce all the
voices that
inform our lives. Feminist
scholarship has begun this

expansion by its integration
of scientific analysis,
historical exploration,
philosophical

engagement, and

literary awareness of the
positions and experiences
of
women in society. It too,
however, has often shut
the
doors against 'suspect
knowledges' - those discourses
such as psychiatry and
psychoanalysis that earlier lent
themselves to the destruction
of the self-respect of many
women. One of the challenges
for us now is to re-examine
those disciplines and discourses,
and to note especially
when they provide unwelcome or
unintegrated insights.
The discovery of a conversational
mode will allow us to

explore alternative explanations
and understandings of
our lives without breaking a
commitment to psychic and
intellectual coherence.

Such a project is difficult to

describe, and more difficult to engage in.
not be regarded as impossible.

But it must

For the price of failure

to enlist in this adventure is the continuance
of tired

211

disputes, both a.ong
politlcal theorists
pursuing a conversational
raode
ootn groups should
fxnd new sources of
the energy and
understanding that are
so desperately needed
if we are to survive
and live well

m

,
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William
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as an
example of the philosophy
of dissonance.
x be i ieve that
our dispute here is
not
fundamental.

He is right to
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beginning with Hobbes,
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betraying the reality of
ambiguity in the social
world.
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that this betrayal is
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its integrity.
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Ibid., p. 445
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